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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF U'TAH
DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS,

I~C.,

Plaintiff,

vs.

LOCAL UNION 976, JOINT COUNCIL 67, \VESTERN C 0 N FERENCE OF TEAJ\1STERS, THE
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD oF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, vVAREHOUSEMEN AND
HELPERS OF A:ThfERICA, AFLCIO, MILO B. RASH, CLARENCE
LOTT, AND JOSEPH w. BALLEW,

CASE NO.
8823

Defendants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF CASE
Plaintiff brought this action against the defendants to recover from them the sum of $125,000.00. It is
in substance alleged in the complaint: That plaintiff, a
corporation, w.as at all times mentioned in the complaint engaged in the business of buying Swiss cheese
1
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and other dairy products from the Cache Valley Dairy
Association of Amalga, Cache County, Utah, and transporting and selling the same toN. Dorman & Company,
Inc., in New York City, and also buying and selling general merchandise.
That for more than two years prior to July, 1955,
plaintiff purehased from the above mentioned Dairy
Association approximately $1,500,000.00 worth of Dairy
Products and transported and sold the same to Dorman
& Company, and that tractor-trailer units were purchased
by plaintiff for use in transporting such products. That
plaintiff had established a profitable business with Dorman & Company and others, which included the purchase
of merchandise to transport from the East to the West,
and tjhat such business produced the plaintiff a net income of approximately $1000.00 per month during the
years 1953 and 1954.
That while the above mentioned Cache Yalley Dairy
A8sociation was engaged in the business of manufacturing Swiss cheese and other dairy products, in about April,
1955, defendant Local 976 made a den1and upon said
Dairy Association for a eonference to secure recognition
as bargaining agent for the employees of said Association, but such de1nand was refused because there was no
proof that the ones who elaimed the right to represent the
employees were authorized to represent the employees
of said Association.
That in order to compel said Dairy Association to
<·.mnply with the demand of said Local for recognition

2
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as such bargaining agent, defendants wrongfully, illegally
and maliciously conspired and confederated together to
prevent the delivery to said Dorman & Company of
cheese produced by said Association. That Local Union
976 was not the certified representative of the majority
of the employees of said Association, or of the employees
of plaintiff, nor had plaintiff or any of its ernployees
been involved in a controversy between said Association
and said Local Union 976, but on the contrary, plaintiff was an independent purchaser of cheese from said
Association, which it sold to Dorman & Company in
New York City. That notwithstanding said facts, defendants, on or about July 25, 1955, and thereafter
pursuant to said conspiracy by picketing said Dorman
& Company's premises and the motor truck of plaintiff
at said Company's loading dock in New York was, by
said picketing .and coercion and threats, and by enlisting
said Local 277 International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
of which Local Union the employees of Dorman & Company were members, induced and persuaded said employees to refuse to handle or unload from plaintiff's
trucks t'he cheese owned by plaintiff, and prevented
pl.aintiff from making delivery thereof.
That by reason of the acts complained of plaintiff
has been damaged in the sum of $125,000.00 for which
amount plaintiff prayed judgment against defendants.
Defendant, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and IIelpers of America, appeared specially and moved that the pretended
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service of Summons upon them be stricken. Such Motion was supported by an affidavit of Joseph W. Ballew,
one of the defendants. The motion was denied.
The defendants, Mi1o B. Rash, Joseph W. Ballew
and Local Union 976, and Joint Council 67, moved that
the action be dismissed upon the ground that plaintiff
had failed to exhaust its administrative remedy pursuant
to the Labor :\lan.agement Relations Act, 1947, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A., Sec. 151, et seq., LRX 3751, and that the
Court was without jurisdiction to hear and detennine the ·
subject matter set out in the complaint by reason of the
above mentioned Labor ~Ianagement Relations Act. The
motion was denied.
In their answer the defendants denied generally the
allegations of the complaint.
At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence defendants
severally moved the Court to enter judgment in favor
of each of the1n, or if that may not be done, that the
Court direct the jury to find a verdict in favor of each
of them. Tllis 1notion was based upon the following
grounds: that the evidence fails to show that plaintiff has sustained any dmnages, and that the evidence
fails to show that X. Dori.nan & C01npany refused to
purcha~e .any 1no~·e eheese fro1u plaintiff because of the
ads complained of.
'l1 he uwtion wa~ taken under advisement. (Tr. 232)

r:rhe fon'going nwtion was renewed at the conclusion
of all of' the evidence. (Tr. 340) Upon motion of counsel
4
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for plaintiff the action was dismissed as to defendants,
Rash and Lott. (Tr. 343) Later it was dismissed as to
defendant Ballew.
Edwin Gossner testified in substance as follows:
That since 1941 he had resided in Cache County,
Utah; that his profession is that of cheese making; that
in 1941 he entered into a contract with Cache Valley
Dairy Association to manufacture Swiss cheese and other
dairy products on a percentage basis. ( Tr. 8) That the
principal market for Swiss cheese in 1943 was the Kraft
Cheese Company in Pocatello. Later a 1narket was developed in Los Angeles and San Francisco. In 1945
and 1946 a market was secured with N. Dorman & Company in New York. That prior to 1950 most of the
cheese was shipped by rail. (Tr. 9) Shipping by railroad was slow and the r.ates to New York high, and it
· became impossible to con1pete with cheese frmn Wisconsin. That the witness discussed the matter of trucking cheese to ~ew York. (Tr. 10) That the Cache
Valley Association did not want to get into the trucking business; that to make it profitable to operate a
trucking business it was necessary to have a back-haul
from the East to the West ; that the Cache \r alley Dairy
Association was a co-operative of farmers organized
under the laws of Utah and as such were pern1itted to
process and rnarket their products, but could not buy
and sell other products. (Tr. 11) rrhat the Cache Valley
Dairy Association asked the witness if he would not be
interested in taking over the business of hauling the
5
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cheese to market; that in September, 1952, he formed
plaintiff corporation. (Tr. 12) That the purpose of
organizing plaintiff corporation was to buy and sell
dairy products, principally Swiss cheese, from the Cache
Valley Dairy Association, and take it to the· eastern
market, and when possible buy whatever c-Ould be bought
in the East and bring it back to Utah, and thereby make
a profit for Edwin Gossner and his family. The stockholders of plaintiff corporation consisted of the witness,
his wife, his son and daughter, and Arnie Hansen. The
witness was the president, his wife vice president, and
Arnie Hansen the Secretary-Treasurer. (Tr. 13) That
the business was surprisingly successful. The equipment
of plaintiff was not new; that a profit was made on
each trip and additional equipment was purchased; that
back-hauls were received from New York and vicinity.
That Arnie Hansen was the bookkeeper for plaintiff;
that plaintiff started out with four Ford tractors and
three trailers most of the time. (Tr. 14) Two were used
constantly for the New York haul. While one was going
East, one was going 'Vest. At times two men went on
the trips, and at times only one. At times in '54 and '55
there were as 1nany as fifteen men on plaintiff's' payroll,
and .at times not more than seYen or eight, and at times
a~ few as five. That the average load of cheese to
New York was 15 tons, or 30,000 pounds; that the
Dorman Company purchased practically all of the cheese
shipped to New York. (Tr. 15) That at times Dorman
& Cmnpany purchased as mueh as 50% of the chee~e
produced hy Cache Vnlley, and at times only about 30%
6
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thereof. That of plaintiff's income as 1nuch as 60 to
70 per cent came frmn cheese sold to Dorman & Company, but considering the back-haul it amounted to as
much as 80 to 90 per cent. (Tr. 16)
That after July 28th plaintiff did not continue to
ship cheese to Donnan & Compan;· as it had done, in
fact, did not ship more cheese until sometime in Septenlber. (Tr. 17) That at the time he learned there was
trouble about unloading the cheese the witness went to
~ew York where he had a conversation with _Mr. Ballew
and Mr. Rash; that a _Mr. Ristuccia c.ame to the place of
business of Dormans in New York; Mr. Ballew said he
would like to talk with the witness about the dispute with
the Union and the Cache Valley Dairy Association.
(Tr. 19) r:rhat about Septen1ber 29th the witness had
a conversation with Messers. Lou and Vic Dorman and
Ballew; that Mr. Ballew stated what he wanted, and the
witness stated he would see what could be done, and
that he would meet Mr. Ballew in Utah. That the witness
saw .Nir. Rash outside of the office of the Dormans and
had a talk with him. (Tr. 20) Mr. Rash said they were
not hard to get along with, and that the Union could
do the witness a lot of harm; that the witness s.aid he
would meet him back in Utah. That Swiss c:heese is
highly perishable. It 1nust have constant refrigeration;
that the average value of a truck load of cheese is $1~,000.00; th.at witness has not heard of any dispute between
plaintiff and its employees. (Tr. 21) That Local 976 of
the Teamsters Union was not at that time certified by
the National Labor Board as the bargaining agent of
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the employees of Cache Valley Dairy; that witness does
not know whether any of the Teamsters Union were employees of the Cache Valley Dairy. (Tr. 22) That about
September 4th a truck load of cheese was loaded on an
Interstate truck and another truck was ordered, but it did
not come because they said we were having labor troubles;
that witness called Mr. Rash and said he could not meet
with him, and within an hour .after the conversation a
truck from Interstate appeared and took a load of cheese
to Dorman; that several loads ''rere shipped, and witness
received word that there was one load in New York that
could not be unloaded. (Tr. 23) That the load went into
storage in the name of Cache Valley Dairy Assn.; that the
cheese was sent on plaintiff's truck and it paid storage
on the cheese ; that Dairy Distributors sent one load of
cheese to Dormans in the early part of September, which
went into storage. Plaintiff sent one load to Dormans
late in October, which was unloaded: that no cheese was
sent to Donnans after October. Son1e cheese was hauled
to Salt Lake, but 1nost of the equip1nent of plaintiff
stood idle. (Tr. 26) That Donnans wanted the cheese;
that after the episode in Xew York the cheese was shipped to ~ew York by independent trucks. (Tr. 27) That
plaintiff i~ still in existence. but it has done no business
to amount to anything since 1956, and practically none
in the lattrr part of 1935. except for the equip1nent which
pia in tiff lea~P<i. and son1e hauls 1nade in the local area.
That th<' equip1nent of plaintiff was solN6-rthe best
price that eould be obtained. (Tr. 28)

8
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Over objections of counsel for defendants, witness
was permitted to testify as to the profits made by plaintiff during the ye.ar 1953-1954 and 1955. We quote the
following from his testimony :
"These profits would vary depending on how
much cheese we would ship a month, how much
back haul we had a month, a load, how much back
haul we had how much profit we made on what
we bought in New York and resold up here, but
it would average out about one thousand dollars
a month net profit over a two and one half year
or three year period."
Witness stated he made a profit on the equipment
because the equipment was set up on a depreciation
schedule. (Tr. 29)
On cross examination :Mr. Gossner testified that the
profit of plaintiff was made from the sales of the product ''which you would call brokerage, I guess.'' That
there was one load of plaintiff that went into the w,arehouse and one load of Cache Valley Dairy that went into
storage. (Tr. 31) That witness did not own the cheese;
that he produces the cheese and sells it. When witness
is not at the plant, the shipping desk takes the order and
ships the cheese. ( Tr. 32) All of the cheese is made by
the employees of witness. (Tr. 33) The assets of plain·tiff, when organized, consisted of an International truck
and trailer, a Ford pickup truck, a Ford Tractor, a
Fruehauf trailer and another Freuhauf semi-trailer.
(Tr. 35) That witness did not know whether the International belonged to the Cache Valley Dairy Association,
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but if it did, plaintiff paid for the s.ame; that witness had
some of the equipment in his own name when plaintiff
was incorporated. ( Tr. 36) That the caterpillar tractor was part of the assets of plaintiff, but it was not used
in transportation; that witness, the auditor and bookkeeper appraised the property that was conveyed to
plaintiff, and stock taken for the appraised value thereof.
(Tr. 37) That the caterpillar tractor was not used to
ship cheese to ~ ew York; that plaintiff could have gone
into most anything under its Articles of Incorporation.
(Tr. 38) That most of the equipment of plaintiff has
been sold. It still has a Fruehauf trailer; the rest is
worn out or sold. (Tr. 39) That :Jir. Rash said he would
picket wherever plaintiff went in business ; that plaintiff went out of business because of picketing. (Tr. 40)
That witness operates the cheese plant on a 15% gross
profit contract. The cheese plant was operated by witness who hired and fired the employees. (Tr. 41) That
from ti1ne to time an agreement was had whereby the
Dairy Association sold its cheese to plaintiff. (Tr. 42)
That witness had a Contract with the Association whereby he was to receive 15 ~c of the sale of the cheese, but
he got only 13% for the most part. The cheese sold
to Donnans was bought fr01n the Cache Valley Dairy;
that the total a1nount of business done by plaintiff was
about one and a half 1nillion dollars per year, but that
included the profit8 1nade on the property bought back
East. (Tr. 43) Not 1nuch cheese was hauled to San Fran<·i:o;<•o and Los _Angeles; that the only deliveries that
could be n1ade were to Donnans. (Tr. 44)

10
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Defendants' Exhibit 1 was received 1n evidence,
which was executed by the witness.
It is dated July :21, 1956, and was calculated to enable
Stanley Forte to secure a permit from the United States
Commerce Commission to haul Cache Valley Dairy Association products to New York. It contains, among
others, these provisions :

"neither Interstate nor any of the other carriers
operating from points in Utah to Chicago has
ever evidenced any great interest in our movement. We sought their services from time to time
and invariably encountered delays in pickup, in
travel time, and, occasionally, had some difficulty
about the condition of the cheese upon its arrival
in New York'' * * * ''for these reasons we at
one time purchased our own equipment." (Tr. 50)
That the witness signed the instrument as Manager of
the Cache Valley Dairy Association. (Tr. 51) That
Cache Valley Dairy Association and Dairy Distributors
had over the r,oad problems. ( Tr. 54) The document
further stated that:
''If the general freight carriers had given
us a satisfactory service, we never would have
gone to the tremendous expense of buying our
own equipment."
Also:
''I am the general manager of Cache Valley
Dairy Association located at Smithfield, Utah and
have seen the statement submitted by Interstate
Motor Lines, Inc., in opposition to the instant
application.''
11
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and
''We tried to escape the problem of selling
f.o.b. Smithfield and placing transportation matters in the hands of our customers, but we cannot always do that. N. Dorman and Company
has been leasing a truck from the applicant on
movements sold f.o.b. Smithfield and they pick
up at Smithfield with the leased equipment."
(Tr. 56)
That all of Stanley Forte's trucks ·were mechanically
refrigerated; that cheese is highly perishable and must
reach New York without any sudden change in temperature. (Tr. 61) That cheese should be kept at between
35° and 40° but 1nay be as low as 32°. (Tr. 62) That
there is a risk in using ice to control the temperature;
that plaintiff had no automatic refrigeration. (Tr. 63)
Arnie Hansen was called as a witness by plaintiff,
and in substance testified as follows:
That he resides at Logan and at one time was a
bookkeeper for plaintiff. (Tr. 64) That invoices were
made every ti1ne a sale was made and he had a payroll,
and the books were kept in the ordinary 1nanner: that the
entries were 1nade in the book in1mediately after the
transactions were had. ( Tr. 65)
Exhibit P-:2 was offered in endence, consisting of
sheets purporting to show business operations of plaintiff for tlw ~·par In5:2 up to and including 1955 and 1956.
(Tr. 67)
On cross exa1uination the witness testified that the
books ~howPd all purchases regardless of when made;
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that purchases made in New York are reflected in the
books; that he does not have the invoices. ( Tr. 67) The
books were offered in evidence, to which Counsel stated
no objection would be made at this time, but probably
objections would be made after the witness was further
interrogated; that further cross examination would
later be had after an opportunity was had to exmnine
the books. (Tr. 68)
Paul B. Tanner was called as a witness by plaintiff, and in substance testified as follows :
That he is a Certified Public Accountant; that he
has done work for the Dairy Distributors Company in
making annual audits of its books; that Exhibit P -3 contain financial information concerning certain periods
of activity of Dairy Distributors, Inc. It contains balance
sheets as of April 30th, 1956, comparative statements for
fiscal years September 30, 1953, September 30, 1954,
September 30, 1955 and the short period to April 30,
1956.
The Exhibit was offered in evidence.
Mr. Tanner on cross examination further testified
that the Exhibit merely contained a sum1nary of the information contained in the books of plaintiff. (Tr. 70)
The Exhibit was received in evidence .
.1fr. Gassner was recalled and further testified on
cross examination: That Dormans did tell the witness
that cheese was received that was too hot; that he did
13
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not rernember if it was the trucks of plaintiff or others;
that cheese could be too warm and yet not damaged;
that witness did not think the cheese of plaintiff was
f:;econd grade. That witness did not have a written contract with plaintiff. (Tr. 75) That there was a contract
with Cache Valley and Local Union 97 6 in 1946, which
remained in effect until 1952, when an increase in wages
was demanded and the Company said it would not give
the employees the increase, and no contract was signed
after that time. (Tr. 76)
~ir.

Gossner was asked what was the nature of his
certificate to haul over the public highway long line, to
which objection was raised that there was nothing in
the pleading about violating the regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The objection was sustained. (Tr. 81) That there may have been times that
plaintiff hauled furnaces, pianos, automobile parts and
articles of that character. (Tr. 82) That calcium chloride
was one of the principal articles that were picked up in
Ohio and hauled back, which was sold to different concerns in the intermountain area. That calcium chloride
was houled back thirty or forty times. (Tr. 83) That
plaintiff has not had an Interstate Commerce Commisf;ion permit. It had the necessary legal permits to operate
on the highways. (Tr. 84) That witness was unable to
namP the pern1its that plaintiff had; that witness reePived the 15 or 13 JWr cent as his profit on the cheese
sold in New York. ( Tr. 85) That the cheese was sold
by the Cache \ ..alley Dairy Association to Dairy DistributorR, nnd Dairy Distributors sold to Dorn1an. That the

14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Associat~on

produced the milk and furnished the building, and witness bore the expense of manufacturing the
milk into cheese, (Tr. 86); that the trucks were picketed
twice at the Dorman docks, once on the 27th or 28th of
July, and once around October 30th or 31st. That witness
does not know how long the trucks were picketed. (Tr.
87) That plaintiff's truck was unloaded after working
hours on the day it arrived in New York. (Tr. 88) That
he believed he attempted to re1nain in business; that
Dormans wouldn't unload .any more Dairy Distributor
cheese; that Victor Dorman told hin1 that. (Tr. 89)
That truck loads were sent after he was told that the
Dormans would not unload any more cheese, and the
cheese was unloaded; one of the loads went to storage,
but that load was not picketed. (Tr. 90) That some of
the conversations with the Dormans about unloading
the cheese was over the telephone and smne in writing;
that witness had a conversation in the presence of Mr.
Ballew with Victor Dorman; that the Dormans did not
tell witness that all cheese sent would be received and
unloaded. (Tr. 91) That witness knew the contents of
Exhibit 1, and also knew that Stanley F·orte was hauling
Cache Valley Dairy Association cheese to New York.
(Tr. 92-93) That at no time w.as there a written contract whereby the Dairy Distributors bought cheese from
the Cache Valley Association, or whereby the Dormans
agreed to purchase the cheese; that all of the agreements
were oral. (Tr. 94) That Dormans were buying cheese
from plaintiff since its organization. ( Tr. 97) That the
Cache Valley Dairy did not feel they could make a sue-
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rer:;s in hauling cheese to market; that Cache Valley also
shipped some cheese with Forte, who is continuing to
haul its cheese. (Tr. 98)
Plaintiff's Exhibit P-4 was offered in evidence and
objected to by defendants, and the matter of its admission taken under advisement. (Tr. 100)
Milo Rash, one of the defendants was called as a
witness by plaintiff, and in part testified as follows:
That he is the Secretary-Treasurer of Local Union
976, and a Trustee of Joint Council 67; that about May
31, 1955, he made a trip with Joseph Ballew to New
York; that he expected to see Louie Dorman. (Tr. 102)
That he saw ~Ir. Ristuccia, the Secretary-Treasurer of
the Local Union, some of whose members are employees
of the Donnans, before he sa\Y the Dormans. (Tr. 103)
That witness did not tell Yic Dorman that he would picket
the Donnans if they handled any 1nore Dairy Distributors cheese; that he did not show hin1 a picket: that
when the matter of picketing was talked about witness
said he would take his chances and .answer in the courts.
(Tr. 104) That witness did do some picketing on Jul}·
26, 195fl. That he carried a picket sign, which is marked
P-11; that ~lr. Lott is shown in Exhibit P-9, and two
other~. one of whom is Yictor Donnan. (Tr. 105) That
the person shmYn in Exhibit P-8 appears to be the ·witne~~ <·a 1T~·ing a sign whieh reads: .. X otice, the cheese
en rriPd. and delivPred by this truck has been worked and
pro<·P~sPd. b~· non-Vnion employees of the Cache Valley
na iry ,\ ~soeia tion, Sn1ithfield. '~ That in Exhibits P-7
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and P-6 appear to be the witness, Mr. Lott and Victor
Dorman. (Tr. 106 That in P-5 appears to be the witness
and the driver of the truck. Exhibits P-3 through P-11
were received in advance. (Tr. 107) That witness picketed the truck twice on July 26th and 27th, 1955; that
witness did not picket a truck in October, 1955; that witness did not picket Dormans so that the employees of
Dormans would not cross the picket line. (Tr. 108) That
he has been connected with the Teamsters Union since
July :27, 1942; that witness does not advise his members
not to cross a picket line; that the signs were carried
around the truck to induce Mr. Gossner to meet with
witness like the National Labor Relations Board had
ordered him to do. (Tr. 109)
Witness first went to N. Dorman & Company building, and the next morning went to Ristuccia's office,
and Ristuccia asked Dorman to come to his office.
On cross examination witness testified he had a
talk with 1\lr. Rosen, the foreman of Dorman's employees; that he did not tell him not to unload the cheese.
(Tr. Ill) That he told M.r. Rosen they were having
trouble with Cache Valley Dairy Association and Dairy
Distributors, and they were there to picket the truck;
that witness has not discussed this matter with Mr. Ristuccia or received his cooperation. (Tr. 112) That the
ethics of an international organization require that when
you go into his territory you inforrn the local union why
you are there; that was the reason for calling on the Local
Union in New York; that the New York Union was en17
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tirely independent from the Union of which the witness
was a member; that the truck was picketed for about
an hour and twenty Ininutes on July 26th. (Tr. 113) The
truck was unloaded the next evening after 5:00 o'clock;
that the truck was unloaded while witness was picketing;
that so far as witness knows all of the trucks from Gossner were unloaded; that the truck that was picketed by
witness was unloaded by the employees of Dorman; that
the purpose of going to Xew York was to talk to Mr:
Dorman and to put pressure on Mr. Gossner with respect
to Gossner's refusal to bargain. (Tr. 114) That Gossner
met with the Union, but never bargained with it; that
charges were filed with the Xational Labor Relations
Board before witness went to Ogden in September, 1952.
(Tr. 115) That the Board ordered Mr. Gossner to bargain with his employees; that witness does not have any
relation with the International Union nor with the Western Conference of Teamsters; that witness does not represent the Western Conference of Teamsters, nor the International; there is just an affiliation, just a per capita
tax affiliation. -·w·itness Inade the first trip to New York
with Mr. Ballew and ~Ir. Lott; that .Mr. Lott is connected
with 983. ~lr. Ballew has no connection with the Local
Union of witness. (Tr.116) The Local Union or the Western Conference did not do any picketing in New York;
that is in ~fay, 1955, when the witness went to New York.
The einployees of the Caehe Valley Dairy Association
were not paying- any dues to the Teamsters Union, but
they had not been decertified~ that witness would say
that he n'presented thein. (Tr. 117) Local Union 976 is
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affiliated with Joint Council 67; that witness does not
know that Joint Council 67 is part of the Teamsters
Western Conference of Teamsters; that labor charges
were brought against Mr. Gossner and Cache Valley
Dairy Association before 1952, but the hearing was had
after 1952. ( Tr. 118) That witness had not been certified
by the National Labor Relations Board when he went
back to New York on May 31, 1955; that witness had a
contract with employees of the Dairy Distributors before 1955; that witness did not know of any difference
between the employees of Cache Valley Dairy Association
and Dairy Distributors. (Tr. 119)
The Court sustained the objection to Exhibit P-4.
(Tr. 120)
On redirect examination Mr. Rash further testified
that Local 976 was in trusteeship; that John M. Annan
of Los Angeles is the Trustee; witness believes he is
appointed to that position. (Tr. 122) That witness does
not recall having had any communication with Mr. Annan; that witness does not pay dues to the International
Union, but to 976; that a per capita tax is turned over
to the International Union. (Tr. 123) Mr. John M. Annan is President of Joint Council 42; that the amount
of dues from members of the local union is 40c per
month per member; that a per capita tax is also paid
to the Western Dairy Council. (Tr. 124) Local Union
976 is wholly independent of 277 of New York and of
Joint Council 42 of Los Angeles, and of any other organization; that Mr. Ballew accompanied witness to
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New York. He was not on the payroll of 976. (Tr. 125)
Mr. Ballew is an employee of Western Dairy Employees
and was loaned to the local union to assist in this matter
under the direction of witness; that so far as the witness
knows none of the trucks of Cache Valley Association
or Dairy Distributors or :Mr. Gossner were ever refused
at the docks of Dorman & Company in ~ ew York; that
the employees of Cache Valley Dairy worked part of
their time for Dairy Distributors. (Tr. 126) That the
Western Conference of Teamsters has jurisdiction over
eleven western states. (Tr. 127) That "witness never
picketed any trucks in New York after July 27th.
The depositions of Harry Rosen, Louis Dorman,
Arthur Nigro and Victor Dorman were ordered published. Part of the testilnony of Harry Rosen was read to
the Court and jury. Following is a summary of the same:
That he is and for between :25 and 30 years has been
e1nployed by N. Dorman & Company. That he is a foreInan and supen~ises the loading and unloading of merehandise in and out of the place of business. He has
been a n1e1nber of the local union for at least fifteen
years. (Tr. 130) That witness ean1e down early to have
a truck unlo.aded; that two men crone to the truck,
and a 1nan told witness not to unload the same; that
witness knew nothing about any trouble and had not
been told not to unload the truck. (Tr. 131) That one
of tiiP gentlen1en said he had pern1ission from the Local
Union to pieket there. "Titness refused to unload the
<'IIPPSe until he rpeeived word fron1 the Union: that
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witness called Mr. Donnan, and witness and the Dorman brothers decided not to unload the truck that
day because they did not want any labor trouble;
that at a later ti1ne he had a conversation with :Mr. Ristuccia about cheese from Smithfield, Utah. ( Tr. 132)
About a week or two later witness asked Mr. Ristuccia
if it was all right to unload another trailer with eheese
from Smithfield, and was told to go back to his place
and his men would be told what to do. That was the
end; that witness did not unload the cheese. vVitness does
not recall any picketing at his place in October. (Tr. 133)
Witness did not know whether the trucks were Cache
Valley Dairy or Distributors; that to the witness they
were all the same. ( Tr. 135) No one told witness not
to unload the truck, but he did not want to unload the
truck with the picket there; that witness assumed he had
a right to unload or refuse to unload the truck. ( Tr. 135)
The truck was unloaded after the witness left; that witness did not want to antagonize the Union. (Tr. 136)
That so far as witness knew the truck was unloaded by
Dorman's employees. (Tr. 140)
Joseph vV. Ballew, one of defendants, was called as
a witness by plaintiff, and in part testified as follows:
That he has resided at Seattle, \Vashington, since
about June, 1957, and is a representative of Western
States Dairy Employees Council; that its functions are
to assist other Local Unions, when requested, in negotiation of contracts, disputes and strikes involving employee' rights; that witness was sent to assist the Local
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Union in Ogden. (Tr. 142) That the purpose of going
to New York was to induce 1\!Ir. Dorman not to buy cheese
from the Dairy Distributors or Cache Valley Dairy, and
to persuade :.Mr. Gossner to meet and bargain with respect to his employees; that the Western Conference of
Teamsters is not a part of the International Union; the
\V estern Conference of Teamsters embraces the eleven
western states; that Mr. Brewster, its President, holds
an office in the International Union. (Tr. 143) That
when the deposition of the witness was taken he testified
that Western Conference of Teamsters was affiliated
with and a part of the International Union. (Tr. 144)
That witness accompanied ~{r. Rash to New York over
:Memorial Day weekend; that the Dormans seemed to be
interested in helping witness out in his request. (Tr.
145) The Dormans stated they wanted the cheese, and
they couldn't duplicate it anywhere; that the Dormans
stated they did not wish any difficulties with their employees. (Tr. 146) \Yitness went with :Mr. Lott and Mr.
Rash to New York to impress on ~fr. Dorman the seriousnel'f' of the problem and to secure a meeting with Mr.
Go~sner.

No threats were n1ade to Mr. Dorman or any-

one else: that on l\fay 31st he met ~fr. Louis Dorman,
\dlO

called Mr. Gossner on the telephone. (Tr. 148) That

witness again 1net the Donuans in the afternoon and
stated to witness that :\lr. Gossner had been talked to,
hut rlid not know what he would do. (Tr. 149) The WestPrn Conferenee of Tea1nsters is not a union. (Tr. 150)

No picketing was done in ~lay when the witness went

22
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to New Y,,ork; that later picketing was done as a last
resort. (Tr. 150)
Ross rrhoresen was called as a witness by plaintiff,
and in part testified as follows :
He had been employed by Cache Valley Dairy
Association. (Tr. 176) That was in 1952. He is a
labor relations counsel and advisor, and represents the
employers in Utah; he was einployed to represent
the Cache Valley Dairy Association, which at the time
was bargaining with the Teamsters; along about 1951
there had been a strike that continued for about 30 days;
that there was an unfair labor practice case filed by the
Union against the Company, and an order made that the
Cache Valley Dairy bargain with its employees. (Tr. 177)
Meetings were had about the contract that should be entered into; that obsticles existed about wages and the
union shop; :\Ir. Gossner insisted that wages could not
be increased because the price of cheese had gone down.
(Tr. 178). .Mr. Rash, who represented the employees,
said the wages in Star Valley were twenty per cent less
than at Cache Valley Co-op, but still insisted on a raise
in wages; that witness informed ~lr. Rash that Cache
Valley Dairy would not raise the wages; that the Labor
Relations Board finally closed the files on the case. (Tr.
179) In 1955 witness assisted :\'1 r. Gossner in determining what was deemed a fair wage; Mr. Rash wrote .a
letter to the employees of the Cache Valley Dairy Association stating they were suspended because they were
not paying their dues, and witness ceased negotiating
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with .\lr. Rash. On July 26, 1955, Mr. Gossner called
the attention of witness to trouble he was having with
getting the cheese unloaded at Dormans, but witness said he could do nothing for him in that matter;
~lr. Gossner instructed witness to do what he could about
the activity of interfering with the delivery of cheese
in ~ew York. (Tr. 180) That witness fled unfair labor
practice complaints in New York growing out of the
trouble at Dormans; that there was some delay caused
h :,~ a question of whether the matter should be heard in
~ ew York or San Francisco. Objection wa~ made to the
inquiry as being innnaterial. (Tr. 181)
\Yitness further testified he was in Xew York on
October 31, 1955, where he had a conversation with Mr.
Ballew and ~fr. Rash at the courthouse. ~Ir. Ballew said
they would picket whenever they felt like it. (Tr. 184)
A n1eeting wat: had by witness and :Jir. Gossner with
~lr. Rash and :Jlr. Ballew .and attorney Reid Xeilson at
the Ben Lomond Hotel on August lOth; a proposed
contract was shown witness, which he looked over and
returned : the contract contained the usual provisions, but
wi tnP~~ did not think :Jlr. Rash and ~Ir. Ballew had
authorit~~ to represent the en1ployees of Carhe Valley
J>air~·. (Tr. 185) The Union had not been certified as
the bargaining agent for the en1ployees of the Cache
\T allPy Dai r~·. Di~eus~ion ''".as had about the wages which
t liP einp]o~'PP~ desired. (Tr. 186) ~lr. Rash stated the
('lllplo~·rp~ \Yonld be satisfied with an increase of ten
or fiftern ePnts per hour.
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Upon cross examination, Mr. Thoresen testified he
had specialized in labor relation matters for about ten
years representing about 200 employers. (Tr. 187) That
at the meeting on August lOth witness stated Rash and
Ballew did not represent the employees of Cache Valley
Dairy. ( Tr. 191) Witness, in the petition filed with the
Board in San Francisco, asked for an election. Later he
asked that the petition be withdrawn and it was withdrawn. (Tr. 192) That at the meeting held on September 5, 1955, witness said there was no need of holding
an election of the employees of the Dairy Distributors
because there were none. At the meeting held on August lOth witness stated he would consider the proposition
presented to him, but later he told Mr. Rash he did
not believe that he, Rash, represented the employees.
(Tr. 194)
Arne Hansen on cross examination further testified:
That he began as bookkeeper for Dairy Distributors
in 1952. (Tr. 209) That he was also bookkeeper for
Mr. Gossner. (Tr. 210) That the audit made by Mr.
Tanner relates to the Dairy Distributors only; that the
Dairy Distributors had $15,000.00 or $16,000.00 worth of
equipment when the witness began to keep books. (Tr.
211) That the assets were $35,000.00 when it com1nenced
business; that there was a depreciation value of $30,290.00 at the close of the year 1956; that was a decrease
of about $5,000.00; that no dividends were p.aid by the
Company. (Tr. 212) That the Company bought goods in
the East and resold them; that witness could not tell the
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amount that was paid or the amount for which it was
sold; that witness could tell from the books the amount
that was received from the sales. (Tr. 213) That witness
has not segregated the sales, and does not know what the
sales and purchases have been; that the amount of profits
varied; that some hauls would make five thousand, some
might make 100o/o, some make 2%; that he would say
that some resulted in a 1oss; that they were not in business to lose. (Tr. 214) That witness could not tell what
was made in he hauling and what was made in the
buying and selling; that there might be son1ething hauled
in on which a straight freight charge was made; that witness could not tell the amount paid for hauling freight, or
the amount that was realized from the purchase and
sale of property; that he has no judgment at all about
the a1nount realized from either source. (Tr. 215) That
it would take a week to get the information as to the
source of profit for one year. (Tr. 216) That it would
be a job to get the infonnation; that it would be necessary
to have a bill of lading to pay the bills. (Tr. 217) That
the merchandise was bought .and sold; that the charges
for freight would be shown in the books. (Tr. 218) That
the witness did not report as a profit if the value of a
truck went up; that articles were sold for more than
the costs after allowing for depreciation, which was put
in for a profit. (Tr. :220) That the ledger does not show
fr01n whon1 1nerchandi~e w.as bought; that witness did
not <·arry a n\eord of accounts ~ble (Tr. 221) That
after Oc.tober 1, 1955, until..--~ptenlber 30th two trucks
and one trailer were ~ola. (Tr. 222) That witness
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could not tell the amount of liabilities at the time of
the organization of plaintiff, but there were contracts
payable in the sum of $11,200.00. (Tr. 223) That the
assets we re $30,000.00 when the books were closed in
1956, and the liabilities $6,800.00; that the liabilities
when the Company began business would be approximately $39,000.00; that the assets were $30,000.00; that
when the report was made the assets were $56,131.00,
and the liabilities were $6,808.71. (Tr 2 24) That Exhibit P -3 shows that the Gossner Farm owed $1,322.82,
and the Gossner Partnership owed $24,348.37, making
a total owing by these two Gossner farms of $25,671.20;
that is part of the assets of the Company; that witness
thinks these items are collectible or have been paid, but
he doesn't recall exactly. ( Tr. 225) That witness does
not have all of the books ; that he does not know whether
the Gossner accounts have been paid; that the liability
that existed when the corporation was formed in the
sum of $16,000.00 was for stock, and that is a part of
the liability of $35,000.00 (Tr. 226) That the witness
could not tell who owed the Company money other than
the Gossners; that the people have all been solvent; that
provision has been made for loss; that there are very
few accounts which have caused trouble to collect. (Tr.
227) That he could not tell for sure whether the accounts

are collectible; that the Gossner farms are both partnerships. (Tr. 228)

That witness does not know what the

$24,348.47 owing by the Gossner Partnerships is for.

(Tr. 229)
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The plaintiff having rested, defendants jointly and
severally moved the Court to enter a judgment in favor
of defendants and against the plaintiff, or if that may not
be done, that the Court direct the jury to bring in a
verdict in favor of defendants and .against plaintiff; that
to permit the case to go to the jury would be to permit
it to speculate on the matter of whether plaintiff has
sustained any damages on account of the acts complained
of, and that any loss plaintiff may have suffered was
not proximately caused by any acts of the defendants,
or either of them, .and that there being no contract
with the Dormans, it may not be said that defendants
caused the Dormans to break the same, and the evidence
fails to show that the Dormans refused to purchase more
cheese from the plaintiff. The motion was taken under
advisement. ( Tr. 232)
LeRoy Schenk was called as a witness by defendants,
and in part testified as follows :
That he drove a truck for ~Ir. Gossner in hauling cheese to Xew York from about October, 1949,
to SPptPmber 6, 1955. (Tr. 233) That witness took a
truckload of eheese to Xew York in July, 1955: that he
arrived in New 1 ork about 5 :00 o'clock a.m.; that when
he arrived at Donnans their foren1an, ~Ir. Harry Rosen,
appeared; that ~I r. Lott and ~Ir. Rash also appeared.
(Tr. :23...f-) That Lott and Rash put signs on themselves
and walked back and forth behind the truck in front of
tlw Donnan building, always in the Yicinity of the
t ru<'k; that 1\lr. Rosen said he was going to call Mr.
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Dorman for instructions as to what he should do.
(Tr. ~35) That the Donnans appeared on the scene
about 8 :00 o'clock, who told witness to wait, and that
Lou Dorman said he w.as going to call :Mr. Gossner; that
}!r. Dorman said he did not think they should unload
the truck at that time; that the truck was then parked
about half a block from the place; that the truck re1nained
there until about 6 :00 o'clock the following .afternoon.
(Tr. 236) That Louis Donnan told witness to bring the
truck back in front of the building where the truck was
unloaded. (Tr. :237) ) That Lou and Victor Dorn1an and
one of their sons helped unload the truck; that the
truck was being picketed when the same wa::; unloaded.
(Tr. 238) That .another 1nan whose first name was
Johnny also helped unload the truck; that in the last part
of April, 1955, witness had a conversation with lllr. Gossner. (Tr. 239) That the conversation was had in the
office of ~Ir. Gossner when the witness and ~lr. Gossner
were present; that .Ylr. Gossner at that time st.ated he
would have to cut down on the men from two to one on
the trucks because he was losing money. (Tr. 240) That
after the conversation one man was used in the operation
of the trucks, except in some instances; that a brother of
the witness was also driving a truck. ( Tr. 241) That .at
the time of the picketing the witness was employed by
Dairy Distributors; that on other occasions the employees
of the Dormans usually unloaded the trucks. ( Tr. 242)
That an employee of the Dormans by the name of Nigro
helped unload the truck; that during the time witness
was driving trucks he was c.alled upon to do other work,
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sonte of which was in the plant and some out on the
fann. (Tr. 244) That a man named Johnny and another
man named Nigro helped unload the truck. (Tr. 245)
~Iilo B. Rash was recalled by defendants and in
part testified as follows :

That witness met in the Ben Lomond Hotel on
August 10, 1955, with Mr. Reid Nielson, Joseph Bal]e,Y, Ross Thoresen and ~ir. Gossner: that a proposed
contract had been given :Mr. Thoresen in New York,
a copy of which was given ~Ir. Thoresen upon this
occasion hy :Mr. Rash. (Tr. 249) That Mr. Rash told
Jl r. Thoresen that if they could get decent wages,
hours and working conditions, the witness thought he
could get the employees to settle for an increase
in wages for 10 to 15 cents per hour; that Thoresen
stated he would submit a counterproposal the first
of the following week. (Tr. 250) That Exhibit D-12 is
the contract discussed. (Tr. 252) That a meeting was
held in the Salt Lake Tribune Building on Deeember 6th
at whirh Mr. Skolnick, Ross Thoresen, Reid Neilson,
Milo Rash and Joe Ballew were present. (Tr. 253)
That at the meeting Ross Thoresen had a paper drawn
up for having an election at the Cache Yalley Dairy
Association, which paper was signed by the witness and
Ross Thoresen, and ~1:r. Thoresen stated he would also
have a paper drawn up for the Dairy Distributors. (Tr.
2!>4) That when the witness arrived Mr. Thoresen said
he would not agree to an election for the Dairy Distributors beeause it 1night have two employees and that there
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was not going to be an election; that Mr. Skolnick of
the National Labor Relations Board stated there wouldn't
be much use for an election when there were only two
employees; that witness made his first trip to X C\V York
Monday night over Memorial Day weekend in 1955. ( Tr.
:253) That Joe Ballew accompanied witness on that trip;
that the purpose of the trip was to persuade Dorman
brothers to get ~lr. Gossner to meet for the purpose of
negotiating .a contract covering wages, hours, working
conditions of the employees of Cache Valley Dairy Association and the Dairy Distributors' drivers. That the
next time the witness went to New York was July :25,
1955, at which time Mr. Lott went with witness; that
the purpose of the second trip to ~ ew York was the saxne
as the first. ( Tr. 256)
On cross examination witness said he picketed .a
load of cheese at Dormans; that witness did not know
when he picketed the c h e e s e ; that witness has
been an officer of a Union since July 27, 1952; that
witness has never told anyone not to cross .a picket line.
(Tr. :257) That when he picketed the truck he was trying
to impress }fr. Dorman. (Tr. 258) That witness does
not know whether the picket signs had any effect on
the employees of the Dormans. (Tr. 259) That so far
as witness knew there was no place where the truck
could be picketed except in New York.
On cross examination the witness testified that he
continued to picket the truck after it had been moved
a half block away. (Tr. 260) That witness continued to
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pi<·ket the truck until it was unloaded; that the employees
of Dormans could not have unloaded the truck where it
was parked. (Tr. 261)
The deposition of Victor Dorman was ordered published, and a part thereof is as follows: That he was
present on July 26, 1955, when a truckload of cheese
wa:-: picketed at Dormans in ~ew York. (Tr. 264) That
he does not recall having a conversation with either
~[r. Rash or :.Mr. Lott, who did the picketing; that he
had a conversation with .:\lr. Ristuccia; that Ristuccia is
the President of Local 277. ( Tr. 265) That witness
stated to Jlr. Ristuccia that the boys do not want to
unload the truck without your permission to which Mr.
Ri :-'tneeia replied, "I will let you know in a little while."
That the wjtnes8 did not hear further from Ristuccia;
that in the afternoon of the same day ~fr. Ristuccia stated
that he said he did not stop the n1an frOin unloading
the truck. (Tr. 266)
~\_n

objection wa~ made to the testimony which was
~ustained, but the testi1nony was not stricken: that witne~~ ~ta.ted that he then ordered the truck be unloaded,
which was done. (Tr. 270) That a later time a conver~a tion \Ya~ had with 1I r. Rash in Jir. Ristuccia's office,
at ,,·hieh time the "'itness and his brother, Rash .. Ristuc<·in and ma~·be .Jlr. Ballew were present. That at that
timP ~I r. Rash requested they cooperate so they could
bring prP~~ure on Caelw Valley to join the Union; that
wit nP~~ did what he could to get the1n to join the Union.
(Tr. :271) r_ehat they sug·g·ested that the Dorn1ans get
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their supplies elsewhere; that they said they would picket
the Dorman establishment and showed a picket sign;
that the brother of the witness asked if it was legal, and
~Ir. Rash replied that he would take his chances; that
witness wanted his employees to unload the cheese and
did not tell them not to unload the same. (Tr. 272)
Over objection of defendants the witness was permitted to testify that the shipment .about which he testified came on a Mid-States truck rather than the Cache
Valley Dairy Association truck because of the difficulty
had with the truck in July; that the Dormans were completely unionized and the Mid-States .and other common
carriers were unionized and witness did not wish any
difficulties ; that the Dormans have continued to receive
cheese from Cache Valley Dairy Association. (Tr. 273)
Additional pictures were offered and received in
evidence showing the signs used in picketing. (Tr. 274~
275) That about one-h.alf of the cheese received by the
Dormans prior to July :25, 1956, was received in Dairy
Distributor trucks; that cheese received by common carrier came in mechanically refrigerated trucks; that cheese
is perishable and should be kept at a temperature of 35
to 40 degrees. (Tr. 277) That the Cache Valley trucks
were not mechanically refrigerated to the best of the
knowledge of witness. (Tr. 278) That witness believes
that cheese should be transported in vehicles which have
devices for automatic temperature control. (Tr. 279)
That witness had come to the conclusion that the best
way to receive the cheese from Smithfield was to haul
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the same in trucks owned and controlled by the Dormans.
( Tr. 281) Witness does not believe any of the trucks
used by Dairy Distributors to haul cheese to New York
were Inechanically refrigerated. (Tr. 285) Witness has
known Mr. Gossner for about ten years; that Mr. Gossner
is the Manager of Cache Valley Dairy Association, and
the Chief Executive officer of Dairy Distributors. (Tr.
288) With few exceptions dealings were had with :Mr.
Gossner; that Dorm.ans do not have a written contract
with Dairy Distributors or with Cache Valley Dairy
,Association; that the Dormans began doing business with
Cache Valley Dairy Association in about 1946; that generally such business was done by ~Ir. Gossner, but business had been done by Leland Seely. (Tr. 289) That
Dormans were billed by Dairy Dstributors for the cheese.·
( Tr. 290) That at times both Cache Valley and Dairy Dis~
tributors would bill Dormans for cheese, and the check
would be made out to whoever billed Dormans. (Tr. 291)
Then when cheese was ordered through Mr. Gossner he
was never told whether the order was for Cache Valley
or Dairy Distributors. (Tr. 292) That at time the payInent for the cheese was f.o.b. ~ew York, and at times
payment was 1nade at Snrithfield. (Tr. 294) That when
paytnents were n1ade it usually included transportation
charges; that when bills were received for cheese shipped
by connnon carrier it usually did not include transportation charges: that son1e transportation was in the DorInans' own trueks: that when shipped by Mid-States
the transportation charges were paid by the shipper.
(Tr. 295) That witness told ~[r. Gossner he wished
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they would join the Union as they did not want trouble;
that conversation along that line was had on many occasions; that the truck that came to Donnans on July 26th
was unloaded by union drivers. (Tr. 297) That every
truckload of cheese brought by Dairy Distributors to
Dormans was unloaded: that the one that came on
July 26th was unloaded the same day at 5:00 o'clock;
that every truckload of cheese from Cache Valley to
Dormans was unloaded. (Tr. 298) That if D.airy Distributors landed a truckload of cheese at Dorman's dock
this afternoon or at any time, the Dormans would probably be willing to accept the same ; that there was a
mutual consent between Mr. Gossner and the Dormans
after the first picketing that it would be best to have
the cheese picked up by a union common carrier and
brought to Dormans by that union common carrier, and
Dormans being fully unionized there would be no recourse so far as Dormans were concerned about taking
cheese through non-union channels; that by doing this
the possibility of picketing again would be eliminated.
(Tr. 299) That witness preferred mechanically refrigerated trucks for hauling cheese, but would not say that
the use of dry ice is totally useless. (Tr. 300) Witness
did not tell Mr. Gossner to go out of the transportation
business; that if witness called Mr. Gossner for a truckload of cheese, he would accept the same no matter how
it was transported. (Tr. 301)
Joseph W. Ballew w.as called by defendants, and
in part testified as follows :
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That he first visited New York over the :Memorial
Day weekend of 1955; that he went to New York to see
the Dormans and to prevail upon them to buy their
cheese elsewhere. (Tr. 302) Witness met 1\Ir. Dorman
twice. (Tr. 303) That he met the Dormans on July 26th
and again on July 27th; that he is acquainted with Mr.
Gossner and has been since April or Jlay of 1955. (Tr.
304) Witness was familiar with the wages paid employees of cheese plants in the same competitive area
as the plant operated by Gossner, and the wages paid
at the Gossner operated plant were lower than wages
paid for similar work in the same competitive area. (Tr.
306) Witness was present at the Ben Lomon Hotel in
Ogden, Utah, on August lOth at which .Jfr. Gossner, Mr.
Thoresen, ~ir. Rash and Reid Neilson ·were present;
that they began by discussing a duplicate contract. Mr.
Thoresen said they were not meeting to negotiate a contract, but to ascertain what the situation looked like.
(Tr. 307) Mr. Thoresen said he desired to look over
the proposed contract, and a meeting could be had on
the following Wednesday, and he would haYe a counter
proposal; that later ~fr. Thoresen and .Jir. Gossner informed witness that there would be no further meeting;
that on the following Septe1nber 6th a n1eeting was had
at which witness, .Jlr. Thoresen .and .Jir. Skolnick, representing the ~ational Labor Relations Board, :Jfr. ~eil
~on, l\1 r. Rash and .Mr. Beck were present; that witness
and his a~~oeiates ~tated they were willing and prepared
to consent to an election which had been requested by
~I r. Uo~~nPr in a filing before the Labor Board. (Tr.
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308-309) .Mr. Thoresen stated it was not necessary to
have an election of the employees of the Dairy Distributors because there were only two such employees, and
that the Dairy Distributors were going out of business;
that the meeting broke up and :Mr. Gossner withdrew his
petition for .an election. (Tr. 310) That no election was
held. (Tr. 311) That Exhibit 12 is the proposed contract
presented to JI r. Gossner in New York and to ~fr. rrhoresen at the Ben Lomond on August 10, 1955. (Tr. 317)
LeRoy Schenk was recalled and testified in part as
follows: That on June :22, 1953, witness informed .Mr.
Hansen that the Dormans had told witness to inforrn
:.Mr. Gossner not to send any rnore cheese by the trailer
because it couldn't be kept cool enough. (Tr. 324-5)
Witness told .Mr. Hansen a dozen times that the cheese
was arriving too warrn; that he told Mr. Gossner only
once or twice that the cheese was arriving too warm.
(Tr. 325) Stanley Forte was transporting cheese at
the same time that witness was hauling cheese to New
York. ( Tr. 326) That in hauling cheese to New York
the trucks were usually iced three times; that it took
about 30 minutes to ice the trucks. (Tr. 327)
Clarence Lott was called by defendants and in part
testified in substance as follows: That he is the Secretary-Treasurer of r:eeamsters Local 983 at Pocatello,
Idaho; that he is Vice President of .Joint Council 67.
(Tr. 329) That witness first became aequainted with
the Cache Valley area in 1929; that he is acquainted
with Mr. Gossner. (Tr. 330) Witness stated he was
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familiar \vith the cheese plants operated in northern
Utah and southern Idaho, and was then asked if the
wages paid at such plants were higher than the wages
paid at the plant operated by Mr. Gossner, to which
inquiry plaintiff objected, and the objection was sustained. (Tr. 331-332) That defendants offered to show
that the members of the Teamsters Union worked at a
number of plants in southern Idaho where cheese was
1nanufactured, and that the wages at the plant operated
hy fi-ossner were substantially lower than the wages paid
at the other plants: that such evidence was offered to
refute the testimony of Mr. Thoresen when he testified
that the reason the Gossner plant refused to bargain
was because the Gossner plant paid higher wages than
other plants in the contiguous territory.
An objection was made to the offer and the same
was by the Court sustained. (Tr. 334)
A deposition of Louis Dorman was ordered pub-

lished, and the substance of the following portion thereof received in evidence: That if a load of cheese were
brought fron1 the Cache Valley plant either by Dairy
Di ~tributors or con1mon carrier, truck or rail, Dormans
would accept the sa1ne. (Tr. 336-7)
On cross examination witness testified that ~Ir. Ristuccia called witness to his office and introduced him
to 1\ir. Rash and l\[r. Ballew where witness was told
Mr. 0 o~sner was not cooperating with then1, and that
thr~r would like it if the Dormans would not take their
('h<'P~P; that witness said that the taking of the cheese
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was of great importance to the Dormans, and that they
couldn't very well just lie down and refuse to take the
cheese; that Mr. Ristuccia said there was some understanding between different locals and one tries to cooperate with another, and that he felt he should cooperate with this western local, .and witness would just
have to refuse to take the cheese; that witness said he
just couldn't take that lying down, and that he would go
through with it. (Tr. 337 -8) That Ristuccia said he
would picket and showed the witness the pickets; that
after the conversation the picket appeared. (Tr. 338)
Plaintiff was permitted to reopen the case.
Exhibit P-4 was received in evidence over the objection of plaintiff. (Tr. 338)
Plaintiff's Exhibit P-16 was received in evidence
with the adn1ission that if the auditor was called he
would testify that the same was .an audit of the checks
and books of plaintiff, but defendants objected to its
competency.
The Exhibit was received in evidence. (Tr. 339-40)
Exhibit D-19 was admitted in evidence.
At the conclusion of the evidence defendants renewed
the motion made at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence.
(Tr. 343-4) The motion to dismiss the c.ase was denied.
Defendants individually and separately objected and
excepted to the refusal of the Court to give their Request
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~ o. 1, for the reason and upon the ground that the evi-

dence fails to show defendants are liable.
Defendants individually and separately objected and
excepted to the refus.al of the Court to give Request No. 2,
for the reason and upon the ground that the evidence
shows that Cache Valley Dairy Association and th~
Dairy Distributors, Inc., plaintiff herein, were so interwoven, each with the other, that in effect the acts of one
constituted the acts of all.
Defendants objected and excepted to the failure and
refusal of the Court to give Request No. 3, for the reason
and upon the ground that said request accurately states
the law applicable to this case.
Defendants objected and excepted to the refusal of
the Court to give Request X o. 4, for the reason and upon
the ground that said request is a correct statement of
the law~ and the Court gave no instruction which included
the contention of Request No. 4.
Defendants objected and excepted to Instruction

~o.

:>. in that said instruction is a Inisstatement of the law.
in that, it f.ails to include the provisions of Section 9-c
of the' Taft-Hartley ~\rt: and also objected and excepted
to the giYing of paragraph (e) of Instrw:;tion 5. in that,
it is a mi~~bltPmPnt of law, and particularly that it fails
to indude the prnYi~ions of Section 9-c of the Taft1-Iartley Act.
I>t>l't>ndant~

<'X<'PJliPd

scYt>rally and separately objected and
to the giYing of Instruction No. 6, in that,
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the evidence fails to show that he was the agent of
any of the defendants herein, excepting defendant Local
Union 976.
Defendants and each of them separately objected to
Instruction No. 9, in that, the evidence in this case conclusively shows that the damages which plaintiff seeks
to recover were speculative, conjectural and uncertain in
that it depended on a prospect of receiving profits in
the future, and the evidence fails to show that there
was a reasonable probabilily that any such profits would
be realized.
The jury brought in a verdict in favor of plaintiff
and against defendants for the sum of $100,000.00. Judgment was entered on the verdict. Thereafter defendants
moved the Court to enter judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff notwithstanding the verdict,
which Motion was supported by an affidavit. The Motion
was denied.
Defendants also filed a motion for a new trial,
which was likewise denied.
This appeal is prosecuted from the judgment and
the whole thereof.
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
The points upon which defendants and appellants
rely for the reversal of the judgment are as follows:
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POINT I
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ESTABLISH AGAINST THE
DEFENDANTS THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF LIABILITY REQUIRED BY THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, AS A BASIS FOR DAMAGES.

A.

Plaintiff bases its claim upon Section 303 of
the Act.

B.

Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence showing
inducement by the Union of neutral employees
to engage in concerted action.
(1) Any appeal by the Union was made only
to the neutral employer and its supervisor.
( 2) There is no evidence of any appeal by the
Union to a neutral employee either before
of during the picketing.
(3) The evidence conclusively shows that the
neutral employees were influenced only by
their employer.

C.

Plaintiff failed to show a Section 303(a)(2)
object in defendants' picketing and other activities.

D.

Local 976, while not technically certified as the
collective bargaining agent of Gossner's employees, enjoyed a Board recognized status at
least sinillar thereto with all the rights and
privileges which the ...\.ct gives to a certified
union.

E.

Plaintiff failed to show an unlawful attempt
by defendants to accomplish a Section 303(a) (1)
object.
42
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POINT II
THE WESTERN CONFERENCE OF TEAMSTERS, PURSUANT TO EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF SECTION 303 OF
THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT, IS EXEMPT FROM SUIT.
POINT III
THE WESTERN ·CONFERENCE OF TEAMSTERS IS A
STRANGER TO THIS CAUSE, NOT A PROPER PARTY AND
NOT LIABLE.
POINT IV
THE INTERNATIONAL UNION IS A STRANGER TO
THIS CAUSE, NOT LIABLE AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN
DISMISSED.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
THE JOINT AND SEVERAL MOTIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS, MADE AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE EVIDENCE
OF PLAINTIFF, TO DIRECT THE JURY TO BRING IN A
VERDICT FOR DEFENDANTS, AND EACH OF THEM, OR,
IF THAT MAY NOT BE DONE, TO DISMISS THE ACTION.
(Tr. 232)
POINT VI.
THE TRIAL ·COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
THE JOINT AND SEVERAL MOTIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS, MADE AT THE CONCLUSION OF ALL THE EVIDENCE, TO DIRECT THE JURY TO BRING IN A VERDICT
FOR DEFENDANTS, OR, IF THAT MAY NOT BE DONE,
TO DISMISS THE ACTION. (Tr. 342-4)
POINT VII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE TO
THE J-URY DEFENDANTS' REQUEST NO. 1 WHEREBY DEFENDANTS REQUESTED THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY TO BRING IN A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AND AGAINST PLAINTIFF NO ·CAUSE OF ACTION.
(Tr. 28)
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POINT VIII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO ENTER A JUDGMENT FOR
DEFENDANTS NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT.
POINT IX.
THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED IN REEFUSING
TO TAKE THE CASE FROM THE JURY AND RENDER A
JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANTS BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT PLAINTIFF WAS
AT THE TIME AND TIMES COMPLAINED OF UNLAWFULLY ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, AND
MAY NOT RECOVER DAMAGES ON ACCOUNT OF THE
ACTS COMPLAINED OF.
POINT X.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT
DEFENDANTS TO FILE THEIR MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT
OF DEAN T. CORBETT IN SUPPORT THEREOF TO RELIEVE DEFENDANTS, AND EACH OF THEM, OF THE
JUDGMENT AGAINST THEM, AND REFUSING TO GRANT
SUCH MOTION.
POINT XI.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING AN OBJE.CTION TO THE TESTIMONY OFFERED BY THEIR WITNESS, CLARENCE LOTT, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE
WAGES PAID AT THE CACHE VALLEY PLANT WERE
LESS THAN THAT PAID IN ADJOINING TERRITORY. (Tr.
331)
POINT XII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING, OVER
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION, THE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF EXHIBIT P-4. (Tr. 338)
POINT XIII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT P-16 TO BE ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE
(Tr. 339)
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POINT XIV.
THE TRIAL ·COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
A NEW TRIAL.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ESTABLISH AGAINST THE
DEFENDANTS THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF LIABILITY REQUIRED BY THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, AS A BASIS FOR DAMAGES.

A.

Plaintiff bases its claim upon Section 303 of the

Act.

When plaintiff conunenced this action, it appears
that a common law action was contemplated. It was
filed in a state court; there was no reference, either
directly or indirectly, to the Labor-Management Relations Act; there were certain defendants included which
the L.M.R.A. would not permit; punitive damages were
requested; and its basis rests upon the common law
doctrine of conspiracy. During a hearing on a rnotion
to dismiss the .action, plaintiff's counsel changed their
theory and announced that they would henceforth rely
upon the L.M.R.A. (otherwise referred to herein as the
Taft-Hartley Act, the Taft Act, or Act).
Plaintiff, then, bases its claim on Section 303 of
the L.11.R.A., the introductory part of which rPad~:

"It shall be unlawful for the purpose of this
section only, in an industry or activity affecting
commerce, for .any labor organization to <mgage
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in, or to induce or encourage, the employees of
any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted
refusal in the course of their employment to use,
manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise
handle or work on any goods, articles, materials,
or commodities or to perform any services where
an object thereof is-" LR.X 3770.
This section is identical with Section 8(b) (4), the
difference being that Section 8 describes unfair labor
practices and Section 303 gives the basis for an action in
damages. The part above quoted is the beginning of
a sentence which relates equally to four separate parts
of the sa1ne sentenc-e which follow, each of which parts
states a particular object which is proscribed if pursued by the unlawful means described in the part quoted.
It appears from the instructions requested by plaintiff
and the instructions given by the Court that defendants
are being accused of using unlawful means to accomplish
the two objects described in Sections 303(a)(l) and
303 (a) ( 2). Defendants deny that they have used unlawful 1neans to accomplish any object and admit only the
pursuance of the object described in Section 303(a) (1).
The discussion on the subject of liability will first deal
with the unlawful n1eans aspect. then with the objects.
B. Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence showing
inducement by the Union of neutral employees to engage
in concerted action.
(1.) Au apJJCal by the U·nion was made only to the
neutral Pmployer and it~ superYisor.
There i~ 1nuch evidence to sl1ow that the defendants
worked with Victor and Louis Donnan, of N. Dorman

46
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

,and Company, the neutral employer, and tried Ly fair
persuasion to convince thmn that they should not buy
cheese from Gossner. This type of economic friction is
expressly perrnitted by the National Labor Relations
Board and the courts, and the privilege extends to inducing not only the employer but even an employer's supervisor. Rabouin, dba Conway's Express vs. N.L.R.B., 29
L.R.R.M. 2617. The only person other than the Donnan
Brothers which defendant, Joint Council G7, contacted
directly during the picketing w.as Harry Rosen, a supervisor of Dorman, and this consisted of a brief conversation during the picketing. The trial court refused to
instruct the jury that Rosen was a supervisor and was
not a Taft Act employee. In fact, the court wouldn't even
let the jury decide this matter under appropriate instructions involving the Taft Act definition of .an "ernployee.''
Section 2 ( 3) of the Act says:
"The term employee ... shall not include ...
any individual employed as a supervisor.''
At Tr. 130, we read, from Mr. Rosen's testimony:

'' Q.

Your position there is foreman'?

A.

That is right.

Q.

Do you supervise the loading and unloading
of merchandise in and out of your place~

A.

True."

And at Tr. 136, Rosen adds that he was supervisor
of Nigro, an employee of Dorman and Company. Since
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Rosen was a supervisor, he, by virtue of the above definition, necessarily is not a Taft-Hartley Act ''employee."
(2.) There was no eviJdence of any appeal by the
Unio11 to induce to concerted action a neutral employee
either before or during the picketing.

lnducen1ent to "concerted refusal" certainly necessarily implies an induce1nent of more than one employee
to join forces and concertedly refuse. Evidence of the
picketing of a truck in the Y1ci·n1t~,~ of Dorman's entrance
without showing what the inducement consisted of and
a further showing of the particular or approximate number of unloaders who were or even might have been
influenced thereby is not enough evidence to get by this
requiren1ent of the statute.
~~--·

~ igro, the only en1ployee referred to in all the evidence and then only incidentally. alone cannot satisfy
this require1nent. In the X .L.R.B. Ys. International Rice
~Iilling Co. case (341 C.S. 665, 28 L.R.R.~I. :2105), the
l ;, N. Supre1ne Court said that a Union's picketing and
Pncouragement of two en1ployees of a neutral employer
did not mnount to an inducmnent to concerted activity.

l s it not significant that there is not one bit of
t P~t i mony in the entire record that the Dor1nan emplo~·pps wPn' called together collectively or individually
for the purpos<> of being induced, influenc-ed or encourag-Pd to avoid handling the Gossner cheese f And is it
not further significant that not one single employee
ol' Dorman was called to testify either at the trial, or in
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the form of deposition, or otherwise to tell of any such
inducement? And is it not strange that no one was called
to testify as an employee to say whether he saw the
picket and to say what, if any, influence it had upon him?
":-ithout such evidence we rnust conclude that the union
not only didn't induce an employee before the picketing,
but also did not influence an employee during the picketing.
The only person who did testify for plaintiff concerning the influence the picketing had, was Harry Rosen,
the supervisor. He had no advance knowledge of the
picketing for it came as a total surprise to him. (Tr. 134136) And it is re.asonable to suppose that as a union
member, even though a supervisor, Rosen would have
been aware of any advance effort by the Union to induce
the neutral employees to refuse to handle the Gossner
cheese.
Thus, it is conclusive from the record that there is
no evidence whatsoever of any inducement of Dorman's
employees either before or during the picketing.
(3.) The evidence conclusively shows that the neutral employees were ~nfluenced solely by their employer.

If we assume that there were employees of N. Dorman and Company who saw the picket signs (and the
record is such that we are left with only an assumption
of such a fact), Rosen's testimony absolutely negates
the idea that the employees were influenced by it. The
only re.ason given for not unloading the truck on the
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Inorning of July 26 was that the neutral en1ployer, the
two Dormans, and the supervisor, Rosen, decided not to
unload. When Rosen saw the picket signs and talked
with Rash and for the first time learned that there was
labor trouble, he did not discuss the matter or concert
with Donnan's employees. (Tr. 131) His first thought,
it appears, was to talk to his union official who was not
available. So he made contact with the Dorman brothers,
apparently either to tell them of the picketing, or to get
instructions, or both. Then Rosen says that the Dormans
and he, Rosen, decided not to unload. (Tr. 132, l. 16-18j.
Where is there concert of action among employees here 1
There is no evidence at all to indicate that an employee
was influenced by the picketing, or that, as a result
thereof, an e1nployee asserted hin1self in the slightest
degree, or that employees influenced the Dorman decision not to unload. 'Yithout such evidenc€ there is no
basis whatsoever for this case to be submitted to a
jury for it to decide if there was any Taft ...\ct liability.
It is obvious that the decisions were all being made
by the e1nployer without any influence from his employees. In fact, fron1 Rosen's testmony, it appears that
the employers were not even influenced by Rosen, the
supervisor. The e1nployer n1ade the decisions and the
en1plo~Tee~, if there were any, abided by them.
Having discovered that it was the employer's decision and order not to unload the truck, we now ask,
who controlled and influenced the unloading of the truck1
\"idor Donnan, after learning that he w.as in error in
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thinking that the New York local business agent had told
Dorman employees not to unload, then ''instructed the
loader and my men to unload the truck, and we ordered
it back from the parking lot to our front door .and
unloaded it." (Tr. 267, l. 7-9)
Thus, if there were neutral employees it is plain
that they had not concerted, and had no influence at all
upon the decision to unload or not to unload. That decision was exclusively made by the employers, Victor
and Louis Dorman. They and only they decided what
was done and what was not done by the Dorman
employees. Such employees expressed no opinion and
exercised no discretion, except to follow subserviently the
instructions of their bosses. For this reason - and
this we emphasize - the truck was unloaded precisely
when and as the employer ordered it unloaded. The
slight delay in the unloading of the truck was caused
solely by the picketing's direct influence upon the employer. The employees- if there were any at the time
of the picketing - felt nothing, said nothing, and did
nothing except as their ernployer told them. The moment
the employer told them to unload the cheese, they unloaded it.

It is, therefore, conclusive that the plaintiff has
failed completely to show any concerted refusal to act
among employees of Dorman and Company. Actually
there is nothing in the record that even establishes that
one employee was even aware of the picketing. Indeed,
the record conclusively proves that if a neutral employee
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had been aware of the picketing it necessarily had no
effect or influence upon him and that the only thing that
did influence any such employee was the en1ployer himself, upon whose orders he quickly responded and followed to the letter. ~ow, regardless of what else plaintiff can prove in this case as to objects or any other
element pointing to liability, his case is lost without the
foundation of proof as to concerted refusal of employees
to act, for influencing neutral employees to concerted
refusal to handle the Gossner cheese is the foundation,
and an absolute pre-requisite, for all else that the Act
requires as a basis for an action in damages.
C. Plaintiff failed to show a Section 303(a) (2) object
in defendants' picketing and other activities.

By raising the issue of certification in the instructions to the jury, the trial court necessarily implies that
there was evidence that an object of the picketing was
to force Gossner to recognize Local 976 as the bargaining
agent for his employees. In other words, defendants are
accused to having a 303(a) (2) object. There is, in fact,
no evidence whatsover that defendants had a 303(a)(2)
object.
Actually, plaintiff alleges and proves only one object: that of persuading Dorn1an and Company not to
do busines~ with Gos~ner, which is a 303(a) (1) object.
But a~ argued in other places herein, that object was
pnr~uPd by lawful n1e,an~ and thus the object itself is
la.,vful. 'Ve again e1nphasize that Section 303 objects
arP unlawful only as the 1neans used to attain the objects

52
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

are unlawful. Defendants admit, and the evidence clearly
shows, that the object was to get Dorman and Company
either to persuade Gossner to bargain as to wages, hours,
and other conditions of employment, or to cease doing
business with Gossner. But even if plaintiff had produced evidence of unlawful means jn attaining an~~ object,
he has, nevertheless, failed to produce any evidence of
a 303(a) (2) object, for there is no evidence that an
object of defendant's picketing and other activities was
to force Gossner to recognize the union as the particular
representative of the employees; and this is the only
object which Section 303(a) (2) proscribes. The Union
never felt it had a problem as to who Gossner should
bargain with. The Board had already designated Local
976 as the bargaining agent. But regardless of this fact
Gossner simply wouldn't bargain. He wouldn't bargain
with .anyone. Prior to the picketing, in fact prior to
August 10, 1955, it never occurred to the Union that
there was a question as to who should bargain with
Gossner. It was not until the parties met at the Ben
Lomond Hotel August 10 - two weeks after the picketing- that Local 976 was advised that Thoresen did not
consider the Union the bargaining representative of
Gossner's employees. (Even then Thoresen received the
union's proposed contract and said he would submit a
counter proposal.) But such oral or written advice
is without effect or merit. Such thoughts must be
entertained in good faith and have a basis in lawful
procedure set up by the Act. If Thoresen or Oo~~nPr
truly believed what they belatedly asserted, they could
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and should have petitioned the Board for an election as
to who did represent the employees. "Whether or not
the Union has lost that status is for the Board to deterInine upon orderly statutory procedure." (N.L.R.B. vs.
Sanson l-Iosiery :Mills, 5 Cir., 1952, 195 F2d 350, 353-354,
29 L.ll.R.~1. 2663.)
Since an object ·of the union is the problem involved,
we are dealing with the purpose and intent and condition of Inind of union officials 2-nd not that of Mr.
Gossner or ~lr. Thoresen. X ow, as to this, what is the
evidence as to what the Union officials were thinking
as to who represented the employees!
.Mr. Rash, a witness for the plaintiff and the Secre-

tai·y-Treasurer of Local 976 and an officer of J. C. 67,
said that when he went to X ew York, Local 976 was the
duly authorized agent for the employees. (Tr. 115, I. 2-4)
l{e sa~·s further that Gossner met with the union offi('ials but never bargained with them. (Tr. 115, I. 17-19)
Al:-:o, Rash's Inind-set or condition of mind, as to representation rested confidently in the security of a Board
Order (.Jiarch 4, 1953, 31 L.R.R.M. 1551) requiring Gosslll'l' to reeognize the Union as the bargaining agent.
Cl,r. 1 Hi, I. :2-G) He was also satisfied that the union
J'('Jll'l'~Pnted the en1ployees as a result of their position
a~

bargaining agt>nt in .a contract which 1nay have been

tel'lllinatt>d, but which tennination had not changed the
union'~ n'prP~l'ntation

position. (Tr. 116, I. 26-30: Tr.

119, I. 1-7)
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This is the only positive evidence on the problen1.
There is nothing in the record that controverts Mr.
Rash's testimony on this point, and he was plaintiff's
witness.
All that :Mr. Gossner himself contributes to the matter is this:
"\Ve signed a contr.act with them years ago.
In 1946 we were threatened with boycott and I
signed a contract and kept a signed contract until
1951 or 1952, until they demanded a great big
increase. We said we couldn't give thein an increase and since then no contract w.as signed, and
evidently that is where that ended.'' ( Tr. 76, l.
14-25.)
So Mr. Gossner really contributes nothing either
one way or the other. Certainly there is no evidence here
that even slightly negatives the union's understanding
on representation.
Mr. Thoresen, another of plaintiff's witnesses, who
was Mr. Gossner 's counsel as to labor rel.ations, says
that following the Board Order to Gossner to negotiate
with Local 976, the Board, in an effort to deterinine
whether the Order was being complied with, wrote letters to Mr. Thoresen asking for information as to its
compliance and that after .a time the Board wrote him
and said it was closing their file on that <'asP. ( 'rr. 179,
l. 19-30; Tr. 180, l. 1-3) rrhis appears to mean that the
Board seemed satisfied that Uossner was bargaining
with Local 976. Whether this was actually the case, as
}fr. Rash denies (Tr. 179, l. 29-30; Tr. 180, I. 17-3), there
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is nothing in all of this that even slightly indicates that
Local 976 was no longer the bargaining agent and certainly there is nothing in this that shows an altering
of the condition of Mr. Rash's mind on the subject of
representation.
Now we come to the particular incident which appears to have changed Mr. Thoresen's mind as to who
represented the employees. On p. 180, I. 12-17, Mr.
Thoresen ~ay~ ).Ir. Rash sent an open letter to Mr.
Uos:'ner's e1nployees in ·which they \\-ere informed that
they were suspended from the union because of their
failure to do their part in a fight for a contract subInitted by the union. "~lfter that," says ).Ir. Thoresen,
I didn't bargain with ~Ir. Rash" on account of this open
letter, a copy of which letter had also been sent to ilr.
Thoresen.
\Yhile this indicates why )lr. Thoresen didn ~t baragin with ).Ir. Rash, it in no way ternrinates the union's
status as a bargaining representative of the en1ployees,
nor doe~ it eYen suggest any connnunication of Thoresen's thinking to the union, nor of an altering of :Mr.
Rash'~ 1nind on the union\;;; established status of bargaining agent for the en1ployee:s.
_Although tlw Board Order of March 4, 1953 had
result('d in son1e negotiations. no agreen1ent was reached
and tltP bargaining parties appear to haYe been content
to maintain a ~tatus quo and wait for a better bargaining elimaJP. At least there was .an inartiYe period as to
bargaining for about two ~-ears during which the union
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made no demands. (Tr. 189, I. 14-27) But it is important to note that t was a status quo situation. There is
no evidence, whatsoever, that during this time there was
any question in any union official's mind as to the
union's right to represent the employees in bargaining
for them. X or during this time is there the slightest
evidence showing that Gossner or Thoresen notified the
Union that they even thought the Union did not represent
the employees. The first such notification cmne August
10 .at the Ben Lonwnd. This was more than two weeks
following the picketing.
Thus, there is nothing at all in the record to warrant
an instruction to the jury as to a 303(a) (2) object
because there is absolutely no evidence that an object
or purpose thereof was to get Gossner to recognize the
union as the employees' representative for barg.aining
purposes. We reiterate, the union was never aware of
any problem as to who Gossner should bargain with.
Gaining recognition was not a problem. The real problem
which the union had was to get Gossner to bargain even
though its bargaining position was established. (See
Cache Valley Dairy Assn., supra.)
D. Local 976, while not technically certified as the collective bargaining agent of Gossner's employees, enjoyed
a Board recognized status at least similar thereto with all
the rights and privileges which the Act gives to a certified
union.

In our analysis of 303(a) (2) of the Act, we have
seen that since there is no evidence as to the p.articular
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object called for in 303(a) (2) there is no point in considering the balance of 303 (a) (2), which has to do with
certification. This is because the part of 303(a) (2)
having to do with certification has no application unless
there is some evidence of a 303(a) (2) object. Since
there is, indeed, no such evidence of a 303(a) (2) object,
it should not be necessary to argue our case against a
303(a) (2) liability any further. But in view of Ju~y
Instructions ~o. 2(b) 5-l(b), and 5(d), it appears essential to proceed under the invalid assumption that there
was evidence that the Union did have a 303(a) (2) object
in mind when it picketed. So we proceed under this
unfortunate assumption.
If there were evidence of such object there would
still be no cause of action under 303(a)(2) if "such labor
organization has been certified as the representative of
such e1nployees under provision of Section 9 of the
~.L.R.A.''

In other words, even if it could be shown that there
had been a violation by the Union of 8(b) (-!)(B) or its
counterpart, Section 303(a) (:.?).there would be a defense
to such conduct if the Union were certified, or-we will
add and prove fron1 Section 9-if the Union enjoyed a
position of ~i1nilar standing to that of being certified,
and we intend hereinafter also to show that the Union
did, indeed, enjoy such sinular standing.
In passing, we Inake this nnportant observation:
~in<'P t lwrP wa~ error, because there was no foundation
58
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in the evidence, and therefore not an issue in this case,
to give an instruction as to a 303(.a) (2) object, defendants were especially imposed upon by being prevented
from arguing to the jury the effect that Section 9 had
in qualifying Section 303 (a) ( 2) as applied to the facts
of this case relative to the defense it gave defendants,
for the trial judge, in quoting Section 303 (a) ( 2) as part
of the instructions to the jury, omitted the words, ''under
the provisions of Section 9 of the N.L.R.A., '' a very
necessary and vital qualification of Section 303(a) (2).
We now propose to show by a brief study of Section
9 that Local 976 enjoyed the protection of the defense
provided by the Act for certified unions.
Section 9 is the Section which lays down the rules
governing the selection of the bargaining representative
of the employees. A careful reading of Section 9 discloses a primary purpose thereof to be the protection of
employees from unions which the employees do not want
to represent them and the protection of employees and
employer from a contest between rival unions for the
right to represent the employees in bargaining. Thus,
to use an example suggested by 8 (d) of the Act itself,
if, after a reasonable period of time, the employees wish
to replace the union which has been representing them,
with a second union, the second union c.annot replace the
first union and cannot even attempt to do so in the
manner proscribed by 303(a)(2) in order to be free of
liability, unless it-the second union-is certified. Thus,
whether the first union attained its bargaining status by
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voluntary agreement of all parties concerned or by
petition, investigation, hearing, election, and finally
Board certification, the Act protects the first union in its
bargaining representative position until the second union
has petitioned and proven by an election called by the
Board that it should replace the first union. The first
union is protected during all the Board procedures and
right up to the time the second union succeeds in being
certified. So it is also where the contest is between an
employer and a union which has been enjoying recognition, and no other union is challenging that status.
~.L.R.B. vs. Sanson Hosiery :Jfills, supra. Thus, the desirable thing for any union is to obtain and enjoy the
status of the bargaining agent, howsoever they come
by it, because thereafter the burden of proving otherwise
is upon a formal petitioner! And nothing short of a
formal petition by an employee concerned, or by the
employer will even begin to upset that status.
But just wanting to upset the status of a recognized
union is not enough. Xor is it enough for an employer
to notify a union, which has been enjoying the bargaining
representative status, that the mnployer no longer looks
upon the union as the en1ployee 's bargaining agent.
All this is governed by Section 9, which in turn is
incorporated into 303(a) (~).
Section 9 (a) in part reads :
•·Representatives designated or selected for
the purpose of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
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such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or to
other conditions of employment. ... "LRX 3757
And Section 9 (c) ( 1) reads:
"9(c) (1) Whenever a petition shall have been
filed, in accordance with ~ueh regulations as may
be prescribed by the Board" (A) By an employee or group of employees
or any individual or labor organization acting in
their behalf alleging that a substantial nun1ber of
employees (i) wish to be represented for collective bargaining and that their employer declines
to recognize their representative as the representative defined in Section 9(a), or (ii) assert that
the individual or labor org.anization, which has
been certifi'erl OR is being currentlyy recognized
by their employer as the bargaining representative, is no longer a representative as defined in
Section 9(a); or
"(B) by an employer, alleging that one or
more individuals or labor organizations h.ave presented to him a claim to be recognized as the
representative defined in Section 9 (a) ; the Board
shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to bel~eve that a question of representatiJon affecting commerce exists shall provide for
an appropriate hearing UpOn due notice.
'Xo
If the Board finds upon the record of such a
hearing that such a questvon of representation
exists, it shall direct an election by sp(•rd ballot
and shall certify the results thereof.'' (emphasis
ours) LRX 3757-8
o):o

>X<
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Thus, the Board is required only to investigate a
petition and unless it finds fron1 the investigation that
a question of representation exists it is not required to
have a hearing. If a hearing is held, before it can call into
play the n1achinery for an election, it must first find
that there is, indeed, a question of representation.
In the case before the Court, prior to the picketing
no employee had petitioned for a change in repre::;entation. The employer had not petitioned the Board for
a change. X o rival union had petitioned. So, we ask
what possible reason would there be for the Union itself
to petition for a bargaining status which it already enjoyed and concerning which no one was complaining
either by petition as provided by the Act or in any
other way~ Furthermore, since the Board, before it called
an election, 1nust first find that a question of representation existed, where under the facts of this record, could
the Board find .a question of representation f \Vhy should
the Board go to the expense and trouble of an election
when no one is petitioning except the union which already
has been, and is, enjoying the status of bargaining agenU
But this is what plaintiff is demanding of defendants
under penalty of drunage liability for their failure so
to do.
~rhese are faeets of this case wherein the jury was
not i n:-:t ructed, in Yit'W of which please note the prejudice
against the defendants which the following interrogation
of 1\lr. Rash by .Mr. Rex Hanson engenders:
"(~.

And at the tune Yon went back to New York,
is it your conten.tion No. 976 had been certiG:2
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fied by the N.L.R.B. as bargaining .agent for
those en1ployees or nott
A.

We were recognized barg.aining agent by his
signed contract before.

Q.

Had you been certified by the N.L.R.B. when
you went back to X ew York?

A. It wasn't necessary.

Q.

Answer 'yes' or 'no'. Had you been certified
by the N.L.R.B. when you went back to Xew
York on :May 31, 1955?

A.

No." (Tr. 118, l. 29-30; Tr. 110, l. 1-11)

In view of the above, instruction 5 (d) is tantamount
to direcUng a verdict of liability simply because Local
976 was not certified.
E. Plaintiff failed to show an unlawful attempt by
defendants to accomplish a Section 303(a)(l) object.

We come now to the error which we claim in the
instructions as they relate to plaintiff's claim of liability
arising out of 303(a) (1). The pertinent part of the
303(.a) (1) object reads as follows: "(1) forcing or requiring any employer o;~ * * to cease * * * doing business
with any other persons.'' We admit that this was an
object of the defendants. But we deny, and there is no
evidence to prove, that this object was attempted by
means of an inducement of Dorman's employees to engage in a concerted refus.al to handle any goods, which
has heretofore been argued. Even if the picketing had
induced Dorman's employees to engage in a concerted
refusal to handle the cheese, defendants clairn their t ra-
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ditional right to picket an ambulatory situs of their
dispute with Gossner, and that the Trial Court fell into
error by failing to instruct concerning the ambulatory
aspPds of this case. Because of what we have said
already about the lack of evidence showing inducement to
concerted action we say that there is no basis to submit
.an instruction as to liability under Section 303(a) (1) of
the Ad. If, however, we assume that there were such
eviden(·e, the jury instructions as to 303(a) (1) are still
erroneous in what they lack or in their failure to give
what should have been given concerning the ambulatory
picketing aspect of this case. Indeed, as to this one
phase alone, we believe we can show that if the Trial
Court had given full consideration to the law concerning
mnbulatory picketing, it would have seen the necessity
of directing a verdict against the plaintiff because of
plaintiff's failure to prove tllis part of his case.
Essentiall~-. the only instructions the jury received
as to 303(a) (1) ·was a mere reading of the act itself.
The obvious inadequacy therein arises from the fact that
this part of the ~\d. a~ written, has perplexed the best
legaln1inds as to its 1neaning when applied to ambulatory
picketing. The jury (and the defendants) are entitled
to the benefit of court interpretations and explanations
of th<' statntP ·~ 1neaning in an ambulatory picketing fact
~ituation .

.\ substantial part of Gassner's stock in trade<·IH'<'sP-was generally on wheels between Amalga, Utah
and ~<'". York City-$15.000 worth on eYery truck load.

·1.:·
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rrhere were two irnportant terminals: At Amalga where
the cheese was produced and loaded on the trucks, and
at Dorman's dock in New York City where the cheese
was sold and delivered. Under such facts an important
situs of Gossner's business was on wheels, and as a
practical matter, wherever the truck, loaded with cheese,
came to rest, that place became an important situs of
Gassner's business. Must the Union under such facts,
necessarily be restricted in any picketing .activity to the
place only where the cheese is processed j? Or may the
Union follow the finished product as it is loaded or
unloaded and use either place, or wherever else the
truck may go, to advertise its dispute 'J? These are questions, the answers to which are not spelled out in the
Act. The answers have been supplied by the courts.
And these court guides and helps were urged upon the
Court in this c.ase. But, unfortunately, and in error,
landmark cases, such as the Board's l\1:oore Dry Dock
Case, 27 L.R.R.l\L 1108, the Board's Schultz Refrigerated Service Case, 25 L.R.R.M. 1122, the Serivce Trade
Chauffeurs Case, 191 F 2d 65, 28 L.R.R.M. 2450, the
International Rice Milling Case, 341 U.S. 665, 28
L.R.R.M. 2105, the Campbell Coal Case, 229 F 2d 514,
37 L.R.R.M. 2166, and others, were completely ignored
by the Court in the giving of the instructions, and the
jury thereby failed to receive the benefit of what the
law is in this field of difficult legal application.
By failing to adequately instruct the jury, it is a
necessary assumption that the jury may well have fallen
into the very error to which the U .S. Second Circuit
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Court of Appeals refers in the case of N.L.R.B. vs.
Service Trades Chauffeurs, aupra.
This was a case ''where the pnmary employer's
businesl:;, travelling about on wheels, rolls up to the
secondary employer's door or onto his premises." In
fact and principle it is a case that is substantially the
same as the case now before the Court.
In considering the proble1n and after quoting from
the International Rice ~filling Case, supra, the Court
says,
''We take this to mean that a union may
lawfully inflict harm on a neutral employee, without violating 8 (b) (4), [8 (b) (4) is identical with
303(a) (1), the former relating to unfair labor
practices, the latter relating to action for damages] so long as the hann is merely incidental to
a traditionally lawful primary strike, conducted
at the place where the primary employer does
business.
·• The trouble lies in deterulining what is 'incidental' and 'pri1nary' in a case like this where
the primary e1nployer 's business, travelling about
on wheel~. rolls up to the secondary en1ployer's
door or onto hi~ pren:tises.. ,
And it is here that the Court points out the particular danger above referred to :
'•To hold that, in such circu1nstances, the
union may not there piC'ket the primary en1ployer
in any wa:y because the seC'ondary employer might
thereby be injured would be virtually to deprive
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the union of ,a powerful weapon which Congress
meant to pre,serve. ''
Having warned us of the danger, the court proceeds
to give us the criteria by which we may be guided to
legal safety. And what is the guide~ It's the criteria
of the Sailor's Union Case (Moore Dry Dock) which
the defendants submitted to the Trial Court in their
proposed instructions but which were completely rejected. "If this picketing," says the Court, "met the
criteria announced in the Sailor's Union Case, then it
was not unlawful because employees of the secondary
employers or employees of other employers, due to their
habitual unwillingness to cross picket lines, refused to
do so, for such effects are within the realm of the incidental."
The Moore Dry Dock criteria are very simple-four
in number:
1. "The picketing is strictly limited to times when
the situs of dispute is located on the secondary employer's premises." Actually, the picketing was never
really on Dorman's premises; it was in front of Dorman's property on a public street. But, 'of course, it
was adjacent to Dorman's place of business and the
only time pickets were in the vicinity of Dorman's was
when the Gossner truck was present. The truck loaded
with cheese was the situs of the dispute and it was the
truck only that was picketed. Thus, there is absolutely
no evidence showing a violation of this criterion by the
defendants.
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2. "At the time of the picketing the primary employer is engaged in its normal business at the situs."
When the Gossner truck was in front of Dorman's and
being picketed, Gossner's employee was there to, and in
fact did, e:o.gage in Gossner's normal business of unloading cheese at that point. There is no evidence to
the contrary.
3. "The picketing is li1nited to places reasonably
close to the location of the situs.'' The truck \Yas the
situs. The only evidence on this point was that the
picketing was always in the vicinity of the truck -no
place else. ( Tr. 260, 261)
4 .. The picketing discloses clearly that the dispute
is with the primary employer." The picket signs plainly
exclude Dorman from involvement in the dispute and
('}early point to the source of the cheese, and specifically
and solely involves as the disputant one of Gossner's
business names : Cache Valley Dairy ~\ssociation.
Thus, defendants meet eyery test. A careful analysis
of ~i1nilar cases where it has held that secondary boycott effects were not just incidental, and therefore unlawful, reveal that the picketing failed to meet one or
nwre of the above eriteria.
ThP Court (no le88 authority than a U.S. Court of
AppPal~) ~a~·~ that .a1nbulatory picketing 1nay not be
unlawful under Taft-1Iartley eYen when there may be a
~peonda ry ho~·eott effeet including a concerted action
nnwng ~<'eondar~· enlployet~8, and gives specific and
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definite criteria by which we may determine when such
efects are incidental. There is not one shred of evidence
in this case that places the defendants or any of them
beyond or outside the standards and limitations of these
criteria. Therefore, he defendants are, by law, entitled
to .a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
But if there were such evidence in the record, it
was, even so, error of a most palpable nature for the
Trial Court to refuse the giving of defendant's requested
instructions of the Moore Dry Dock criteria, since they
are the one and only legal standard by which the jury
would be guided in determining whether there was in
fact a 303(,a) (1) liability; or, on the other hand, whether
it was lawful picketing and that whatever harm, if any,
flowing therefrom was only incidental to the lawful
picketing~

One other important observation relative to the
purpose and spirit of the st.atutes under consideration.
Congress undoubtedly was primarily concerned with
damage suffered by innocent third parties (secondary
employers) where there was an active dispute between
primary employers and primary employees. The third
party innocent byst.ander in this case is Dorman and
Company. If it were injured, it is not complaining. And
the protection intended for Dorman and Company i's
now claimed by one for whom it was not intendedeven if Gossner, otherwise, could prove his case.

69
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT II.
THE WESTERN CONFERENCE OF TEAMSTERS, PURSUANT TO EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF SECTION 303 OF
THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT, IS EXEMPT FROM SUIT.

The labor organization mentioned in Section 303(a)
of the Act is defined in Section 2 (5) as follows :
" (5) The term 'labor organization' means
any organization of any kind, or any agency or
employee representation comn1ittee or plan, in
which employees particjpate and which exists for
the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes,
wages, rates of pay, hours of en1ployment, or
of conditions of work."
It is a matter of very common knowledge, at least
in the world of labor affairs, that the \V estern Conference of Teamsters was not organized for and does not
exist for the purpose of collective bargaining. It is without dispute whatsoever that the \Yestern Conference of
Teamsters is not even a labor union. The dismissed
defendant, Joseph \V. Ballew, was called by the plaintiff, which testimony is undisputed, and testified as
follows:

..

(~.

~ o\\·, with re:::;pert to the \\~estern Conference
of 1\)amster:::;. so called. do ~rou know whether
or not that is a labor union f

.\.

It isn't a labor union as such .

Q.

\Vhat~

A. It

isn't a labor union, as such. It doesn't
negotiate or .anything of that nature." (Tr.
149-50)
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The dismissed defendant Rash was called by plaintiff and respecting which testimony there is no disptde,
testified that the Western Conference of Teamsters is
not a labor union, that he, Rash, has no control over the
Western Conference of Teamsters and the \V estern Conference of Teamsters has no control over him. ( Tr. 125)
Hence, if theW estern Conference of Teamsters does
not fall within the definition of Sub-Section 5 of Section
2 of the L.~LR ..A. and there is no dispute in such behalf,
therefore it is exempt and may not here be sued and its
motion to dismiss should have been granted.

POINT III.
THE WESTERN CONFERENCE OF TEAMSTERS IS A
STRANGER TO THIS CAUSE, NOT A PROPER PARTY AND
NOT LIABLE.

The summons in this cause was purportedly served
upon the dismissed defendant, Joseph W. Ballew.
The Western Conference of Teamsters hires no employees in Utah, it employs no employees in Utah, it
has no principal office, branch ,sub-division or representative in Utah - in short, the record discloses not
one scintilla of evidence wherein the Western Conference of Teamsters is connected in anywise with this case;
It took no action respecting the case or even knew about
it or ever transacted or did any business in Utah since
its organization. Joseph W. Ballew, a witness produced
on the part of the plaintiff, whose testilllony is undisputed, testified as follows :
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"Q.

A.

\Vill you state your name, please?
Joseph W. Ballew.

Q. Where do you live, Mr. Ballew?
A.

18230 Evanston, Seattle, Washington.

Q. How long have you lived there?
A.

Since approximately June of 1957.

Q.

This year?

A.

Yes sir.

Q.

\Yill you state your business or

A.

I am representative of the Western States
Dairy Employees Council.

Q.

How long have you been employed in that
capacityf

A.

It is over three years.

Q.

\Yere you e1nployed in that capacity in the
year 1955 in Salt Lake City?

A.

Yes, sir." (Tr. 1-±1)

occupation~

Mr. Milo Y. Rash was called by the plaintiff and
testified as follows:
"Q.

X ow. ~I r. Ra::-h. is the \Yes tern Conference
of Tea1nsters a labor union~

A.

X ot a::' such. no.

Q.

Do

A.

No sir.

Q.

Dm's it have any control over you~

A.

No sir.

~-ou

hnYP any control over it~

,_

-q
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Q. You stated to adversary counsel, Mr. Ballew
accompanied you to New York.
A. Yes sir.
Q. Was he on your payroll, 97 6?
A. No sir.
Q. How did you come to get Mr. Balle-w to go
·with you to New York?
A.

_Mr. Balle\\' is an employee of Western Dair;:
Employees and he was loaned to our local
union under my direction to help in this
matter.

Q. He was working and whatever he did was
exclusively under your jurisdiction?
A. Yes sir.

Q. And direction 1
A. Yes sir." ( Tr. 125-6)
The record showing no scope of employment and
no agency respecting the vVestern Conference of Teamsters and Mr. Ballew, but on the contrary showing conclusively that Mr. Ballew was the employee of the
Western Dairy Council and that whatever work he did
was under the exclusive direction and control of I\ I r.
Rash, and that Mr. Rash had no control over the Western
Conference of Teamsters and the Western Conference of
Teamsters had no control over Mr. Rash, it would seent
that any further comment on our part to the effect that
the Western Conference of Teamsters is a stranger to
this record, was wrongfully made a party herein and
should have been dismissed, would be wholly unnecessary.
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POINT IV.
THE INTERNATIONAL UNION IS A STRANGER TO
THIS CAUSE, NOT LIABLE AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN
DISMISSED.

We here expressly invite the Court's attention to
the fact that the record shows without dispute that only
one defendant engaged in any picketing which \Yas, to
wit: the defendant, Joint Council67.
It is essential in this behalf that the defendant must
conform to the fundamental rules of the agency which
it asserts, the rules which control the determination of
the responsibility of International Union for a breach
of the Taft-Hartley Act, if any, on the part of the Joint
Council. The burden of proof is cast on the plaintiff
to prove the agency relationship both as to existence of
the relationship and the nature and extent of the agent's
authority; agency being a contractural relationship deriving from the consent of the principal and agent that
the agent shall act for the principal; hence the scope of
the agent·~ authority 1nust ah,·ays be shown by the party
asserting such agency.
As far back as the year 1920 in a decision written
by Chief Justice Taft and argued before the Court by
Charle~ Evan8 Hughes, United ]/hre Workers FS. Coronado Coal Company, 66 Law ed 975-259 F.S. 34-1. it was
specifically held that a national union cannot be held
rP~ponsible for actiYity conducted by a local union unless
the national union assu1nes f'xpr._:•ssly such responsibility.
7-!
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There is not one iota of evidence in this record that
the defendant International Union ever heard of or knew
anything about this case. None of its officers, general
or otherwise, participated in the picketing or the long
negotiations which lead up to and induced the picketing.
There is no evidence that the International has an authorized agent in r tah, general, special or otherwise. There
is no evidence that the International has an office in
rtah, general, special or otherwise. There is no evidence
that it has ever fired, hired or employed any persons in
any wise connected with this case to act for it in such
behalf. There is no evidence that it has ever indicated
any intention or paid out one cent respecting this case
or that it has ever transacted any business in Utah, New
York, or anywhere else in respect to this case or at all.
Service of summons in this cause was purportedly
made upon the defendant International Union by delivering a copy of same to the dismissed defendants, Joseph
\V. Balle\v and Milo V. Rash. Motion to quash the service
of such process was made but overruled.
There is no dispute in the record respecting l\T r.
Ballew's employer and by whom he was compensated.
It was the Western Dairy Council. Nor is there any
dispute in the record respecting the fact that Mr. Ballew
was loaned to Local Union 976 and while so temporarily
on loan, was under the immediate and exclusive control
and direction of Mr. Rash, the secretary of said Local
Union 976, presumably because such local union had a
large dairy membership and paid per capita tax to Mr.
75
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Ballew's employer, the Western Dairy Council. There is
not the slightest evidence in the record that Mr. Ballew
takes orders from, or is on the payroll of, or an agent
of the International Union, or bears any connection,
remote, direct or otherwise, with the International, except
perhaps his membership status which, along with
1,670,000 others, requires him to pay into his local union
about thirty cents per capita per month to be in turn
paid by his local union to the International Union at
its headquarters in the City of Washington, D.C.
:Mr. Rash is neither an elective officer of the International, nor an appointed International representative,
nor has he ever held himself out to be such. There is
not even a hint in the record that the International
could or did ever make a grant of authority to a local
union officer to hold himself out as an officer of the
International Union. ~Ir. Rash was called on the part of
the plaintiff and testified:

"Q.

You hold 1nen1bership meetings, you pay your
bills, and you collect your dues, and you negotiate vour contract autonon1ousl~~ from your
ow·n Local lTnion at headquarters in Ogden?

A. Yes.
Q. EverY contract signed is signed by the secretary ~f the lTnion, by ~[ilo V. Rash Y

A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the contracts had with Mr. Gossner back
in 1947 were signed by the secretary of the
Union?
A.

Yes.
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Q. .Mr. Annan's name was not on any of then11
A.

No.

Q. How 1nuch is
A.

paid~

Forty cents per member per month.

Q. And every Local Union in the United States,
Canada, and Hawaii, and Puerto Rico and
ever~'where else does the same~
A.

Yes, no difference.

Q. Like·wise you pay per capita tax into Western
Dairy Council~
A. Yes sir.

Q. John .JI. Annan, or nobody else, fixes those
dues except the International which you decide to pay in Ogden?
A.

Correct.

Q.

So far as you know, Local Union 976 is completely an autonomous organization~

A.

Correct.

Q. And is wholly independent of 227 In New
York~

A. Yes.

Q. And wholly independent of Joint Council -4-:2
in Los Angeles~
A. Yes.

Q. And wholly independent from any other
organization~

A.

Yes.

Q.

(By .Mr. Beck). Now, Mr. Rash, is the Western Conference of Teamsters a Labor ( Tnion?
77
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A.

Not as such, no.

Q. Do you have any control over it~
A. No sir.
Q. Does it have any control over YOU?
A. No sir.
Q. You stated to adversary counsel, Mr. Ballew
accompanied you to New York 1
A. Yes sir.
Q. \Yas he on your
A.

pa:\~roll,

!JIG?

Xo sir.

Q. How did you con1e to get Mr. Ballew to go
with you to Xew York?
A.

l\lr. Ballew is an employee of Western Dairv
Employees and he was loaned to our lo~l
r nj on under my direction to help in this
matter.

Q.

He was working and whatever he did was
exclusively under your jurisdiction~

A.

Yes sir.

Q. And direction Y
A.

Ye~

sir." (Tr. 1:24-1:26)

Therefort>. if Local Union 976 is wholly an autononlous union and an independent union that pays its own
bills; that fixes and collects its own dues; that negotiates
and signs ib own contracts. including the contracts with
Mr. Gossner ever since the year. 19-!'7. and that the only
connection it bears to the defendant International is the
pa~·mpnt of dues at its headquarters in the City of
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Washington, D.C., it is most bewildering to us upon what
theory the International is sued and, furthermore, how
a valid service of summons could be made upon Ballew
or Rash in their capacity as officers of the International
Union even under a 301 contract case pursuant to Section
301 (d) of the Act or how the specific acts of Rash could
be determined to be the acts of the International agent
as required by Section 301 (e) of the Act or how Rash
could be found, by any stretch of statutory interpretation,
to be an authorized agent of the International pursuant
to Section 301 (c) of the Act or how the Court would
acquire jurisdiction under 303 (b) of the Act.
The Court will perhaps note the effect of the word
"only" in Section 303(a) of the Act. It reads:
"Sec. 303. (a) It shall be unlawful; for the
purposes of this section only, in an industry or
activity affecting com1nerce, for any labor organization to engage in, or to induce or encourage
the employees of any employer to engage in. a
strike or a concerted refusal ..... "
And also the limitations respecting the amount in
controversy in Section 303(b) in reference to U.S. District Courts, which paragraph also gives authority to
sue in state courts, provided, of course, the state court
has jurisdiction over the party which aparently it does
not here have. The causes of action set out in Section
301 and Section 303 are entirely different. However,
Section 301 relaxes the jurisdictional standards for U.S.
District Courts.
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lJ sually the best evidence of what the Congress of
the United States means, is what it says. If it had said
in Section 301 (d) that service of process may be made
upon the International by serving an officer of the International in its capacity or the International capacity,
shall constitute service upon the labor organization, there
might be an outside chance for the plaintiff to make a
pitch in this behalf, but the Congress does not say that.
It plainly says his capacity, meaning, of course, the
authorized status of the man delegated such authority
by the International rnion to so represent the International Union in such capacity, shall constitute service
upon the labor organization. Obviously, the word, "agent"
in Section 301 (d) of the Act means a person authorized
to act in the name of the labor organization so pursued.

We 1nention the foregoing to illustrate the fact that
the International is a stranger to this case and a fortiori
the trial judge hirnself 1nust haYe had great doubt respecting jurisdiction over the International Union, as the
following colloquy at the conclusion of the case discloses:
"THE corRT: The record Inay so show.
"X ow I haYe one problen1 in connection with
your motion, ~Ir. Hanson. what does the evidence
~how to tie in the International Terunsters, I am
"~I R. H AK~OX: ~lr. Rash testified he was
trnsteP appointed by 2\lr. Jack Annan of Los
. .:\ ng-PIP~.

"11 HE COFRT: He was trustee of this Local
trustee of thi~ Local and appointed.
"~I R. HAX~ON": He was trustee of this Local
and appointed hy nlr. Annan, Chairman of the

so
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Executive Board, that is in the evidence, and one
of the Divisions of the Western Teamsters Union
is one of the Divisions of the International Union,
and I think he also testified he did represent his
particular Dairy Council, which is part of the
International Union.
"THE COURT: I have that in mind too. To
what extent does that bring in the International
Union~

"1fR. HAXSON: If you have a particular
individual coming from the West Coast organization to handle this, and Mr. Ballew came to handle
this situation to" THE COURT: The evidence shows the
\V estern Conference was involved, if they are
involved does that involve the International~
"MR. HANSON: I think so, because they
are the part of the International, and Mr. Ballew
was appointed by Jack Annan of Los Angeles,
who was appointed by the International Board
of the Union. These trustees are under the direction and control of the International Union. We
have alleged in our complaint Mr. Ballew was
a member of the Western Conference, and the
Western Conference is like saying the country
has four divisions and one of the divisions is
Western Conference of Teamsters, which is an
integral part of the Union.
"MR. ALLEN: The Statute specifically says
in determining whether any person acting for
another, the question is whether the specific ads
are actually ratified, shall not be controlling, it
isn't necessary to show the acts authorized in
advance or subsequently ratified to impose responsibility."
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Whether the above remarks of adversary counsel
persuaded the Court to refuse dismissal of the defendant
International Union, we do not know. Certainly there
is not and could not be any connection between Mr.
Annand and Mr. Ballew except perhaps social and that
is not shown, but respecting one aspect, we are certain.
Either we do not understand the import of Section 301 (e)
of the Act or it has been misread. It reads:
"For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any person is acting as an agent of
another person so as to make such other person
responsible for his acts, the question of whether
the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling." (emphasis ours)
Regardless of the fact that this is a state court
action and not covered by the jurisdictional amount in
controversy exception applicable to Federal District
Courts in Section 301, the above remarks respecting
agency make no contribution to the applicable law because and by reason of the fact that no delegation of
authorit~~ whatsoever is shown whereb~T either Ballew
or Rash could or did act for the International Union.
So whether the specific act under a general grant of
authority was specifically authorized previously or confirlned subsequently is of no eonsequenee and incompetent in the absence of authority to act for the International generally or at all, that is to say, in the presence
of a vacuun1 of authority on the part of the International.
r~rhe

reeord shows that Jack ~\nnand lives in Los
j\ngeles, is president of Joint Council-!:~. has never been
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in Ogden, has written no letters to Local No. 976;
that Local 976 is an autonomous independent organization. But assume that Jack Annand lived in Ogden and
had been appointed by the International Union to negotiate, sign and did negotiate and sign all contracts, conduct all meetings, collect and fix all dues, account for
all moneys for and in behalf of the memberhsip of Local
Union 976 until such time as a re-organization could be
effected, by no stretch of the law of agency, could a
valid claim be made that he was acting in a capacity
for the International Union, such as to tie the International Union with the picketing of Joint Council 67
without an affirmative showing on the part of the International Union executive management that it expressly
authorized such grant of power to so act.
A case which illustrates the flow of authority between an International Union and a local union within
or without trusteeship is: "Farnsworth and Chambers
Company vs. Sheet Metal Workers International Association, 125 Federal Supp. 830-35 LRRM 2582.''
Another case which we think illustrative of the principle at hand is Axel Newman Company vs. Sheet Metal
Workers, 37 LRRM 2038, from which we quote the court's
conclusions :

"1. Service of process upon a labor organization for purposes of suits brought under Sections 301 and 303 of the Taft-Hartley Act must,
pursuant to Section 301 (d) of the Act, be effected
by service upon an officer or agent of such labor
organization.
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"2. An 'agent' of a labor organization, within the meaning of Section 301 (d) of the Act, is
a person who is authorized to act for, in behalf
of, or in the name of such labor organization.
"3. E. C. vVinter is not an 'agent' of the
International, within the meaning of Section
301 (d) of the Act, by virtue of his membership
in the International.
"4. E. C. Winter is not an 'agent' of the
International, within the meaning of Section
301 (d) of the Act, by virtue of his membership
in the Local.
"5. The local is a self-governing unincorporated association whose officers and agents are
elected and compensated by and are authorized
to act for, on behalf of, and in the name of its
own membership. Those said officers and agents
are not, by virtue of such status, agents or subagents of the International in the sense that they
may act for, in behalf of, or in the name of the
International and by their actions bind the International.
"6. E. C. \Vinter is not an "agent' of the
International, within the meaning of Section
301 (d), b~- virtue of his being the incumbent of
the office of Business ~\gent or Representative
of the Local.
"7. E. C. \Vinter is not an 'agent' of the
International within the 1neaning of Section
301 (d) of the Aet by virtue of any special appoinhnent to such capacity b~- the General President or an~- other general officer of the International."
Another ea~e illustrative of the agency principle
involved herein is Dail,11 Rerie1c Corporation L's. Inter84
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national Typographical Union, 9 FRD :293, 17 Labor

Cases 65,292, wherein it was held services of process
upon the president of the local is not sufficient to confer
upon the Court jurisdiction over the International in
the absence of clear proof that the local's president or
the local itself has express authority to represent the
International as its agent.
A quote from Senator Taft respecting agency from
the floor of the Senate is set out in the case of Isu ra ndsen
Company, Inc. vs. National111a-ritime EugiJleers !JrJtefit
Association, 9 FRD 541. 17 Labor Cases (i3,-l-:13, to wit :
"Some of the provisions of this bill deal \vith
the question of making the unions responsible.
There is no reason in the world why a union should
not have the same responsibility that a corporation has which is engaged in business. So we have
provided that a union may be sued as if it were
a corporation."
Now if the law of agency applicable to a private
corporation and its subsidiary is to be altered to confonn
to plaintiff's theory of agency respecting the ;.;tatu;.; of
Ballew and Rash in the case at bar, then, and in such
an event, an agent of one of the coal, oil, trucking or
other subsidiaries of the Union Pacific Rairoad ( ~omp<w~·
would become agents of the parent company. In the case
of a private corporation, the controlling company not
only owns all of the stock of the subsidiary generally
but interlocks its own directors and officers on the boards
of the subsidiaries so as to achieve virtually hundn:d
per cent control, whereas with the International Union

'
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not only is the local union self-controlled and autonomous
generally, but most all the International can do or does
do is collect per capita tax from the local union and
can't do that from a joint council. Even in the presence
of dishonesty, negligence and mismanagement, approxiJHatel:· all the International "Cnion rnay do is temporarily
take charge of the money affairs only of the local union,
and we here ernphasize, not for the International's benefit
but for the exclusive benefit of the local union membership, and only until such time as local union membership management is restored to full control. In neither
case does the local union management act for anyone
ebe except the local union membership. Hence, if the
authors of Section 303 of the Act intended to permit
suits against a union upon the same basis as that applicable to a private corporation which does not expressly
authorize a subsidiary to so act, and the language of
Section 303 indicates such authorized agent must be a
person, in ~uch event Rash could not possibly be an
agent for the International Union nor Ballew an agent
of the \Vestern Conference of Teamsters, so as to tie
the International and Western Conferences of Teamsters
to t lw picketing of the truck by Joint Council 67 upon
the public streets of New York City.
In closing this portion of our brief, we especially
invite the Court's attention to the fact that the burden
i:-; upon the plaintiff to prove that the International
Union i::-~ the type of labor organization as defined in
s~·<·tioll ~ ( J) 0 r th<:> . \d; this is essential to plaintiff's
ea1"e and in :-;ueh behalf it produced no evidence pursuant
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to Section 303; and furthermore notwithstanding defendants Ballew, Rash and Lott have been dismissed, nowhere
in the evidence does it appear that the Internatjonal
Union or the Western Conference of Teamsters maliciously or otherwise conspired with the dismissed defendants or the remaining defendants or anyone or at all,
as alleged by plaintiffs in paragraphs 6 and 7 of its
complaint; that nowhere in the evidence does it appear
that the International Union hired Ballew or Rash or
gave them any orders or directions or communicated
with them or knew them.
\Y e challenge adversary council to produce one single
case where an International lJnion has been successfully
sued pursuant to Section 303, unless it is a case after
the fashion of a United Mine Workers 50 case which is
the International Union or unless International Union
officers had control and personally planned and actively
participated in the tort complained of, all of course in
the scope of the agency and at the instance of the International Union.
We submit the Court manifestly erred in its refusal
to strike and dismiss the International Union as a part:·
defendant.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
THE JOINT AND SEVERAL MOTIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS, MADE AT THE ·CONCLUSION OF THE EVIDENCE
OF PLAINTIFF, TO DIRECT THE JURY TO BRING IN A
VERDICT FOR DEFENDANTS, AND EACH OF THEM, OR,
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IF THAT MAY NOT BE DONE, TO DISMISS THE ACTION.
(Tr. 232)
POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
THE JOINT AND SEVERAL MOTIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS, MADE AT THE CONCLUSION OF ALL THE EVIDENCE, TO DIRECT THE JURY TO BRING IN A VERDICT
FOR DEFENDANTS, OR, IF THAT MAY NOT BE DONE,
TO DISMISS THE ACTION. (Tr. 342-4)
POINT VII.
THE TRIAL ·COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE TO
THE JURY DEFENDANTS' REQUEST NO. 1 WHEREBY DEFENDANTS REQUESTED THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY TO BRING IN A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AND AGAINST PLAINTIFF NO CAl:SE OF ACTION.
(Tr. 28)
POINT VIII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO ENTER A JUDGMENT FOR
DEFENDANTS NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT.

The questions of law r.aised by Points Five, Six,
Scn_'n and Eight are substantially the same. and, therefore, our discussion under thi:-: heading is intended to
a pp I~- to each and all of such points.
Plaintiff elaim~ that it was put out of business by
what Ha~h. Lott and Ball(_•w did and said at the place of
lm:-; i1w:-;:-; of Donnan and C01npany in X ew York on or
ahont tJ ul~· :2G. and :21. 1955. X o elain1 is n1ade that any
danmg-<' wa~ done as a rPsnlt of the picketing to the cheese

ss

1
~ij
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contained in the truck that was picketed. The sole claim
made by plaintiff is that it lost future profits that it might
have made if it had not lost its market to sell Swiss cheese
to N. Dorman and Company. Even if this Court should
conclude, contrary to defendants' contention, that defendants, or some of them, were guilty of wrongdoing in
picketing the trucks, yet the evidence falls far short of
showing that plaintiff is entitled to any money judgment
against defendants, or either of them. We say that because: First. The evidence touching the question of any
damage which plaintiff may have sustained is so uncertain, contingent and speculative that it will not support
the amount of the verdict of the jury, or any part thereof.
Second. That the evidence shows plaintiff had no contract with Cache Valley Dairy Association whereby it
was entitled to continue to purchase Swiss cheese, and
had no contract with N. Dorman and Company whereby
N. Dorman and Company was obligated to purchase
cheese from plaintiff. Third. There is no substantial competent evidence that N. Dorman and Company refused
to continue to purchase cheese from plaintiff because of
the picketing of the truck of plaintiff. Fourth. The evidence affirmatively shows that N. Dorman and Company
were willing to continue to purchase, and did purchase,
Swiss cheese delivered by plaintiff after the picketing
complained of. Fifth. That the evidence conclusively
shows that the business of plaintiff in transporting Swiss
cheese from Utah to New York, and other materials frmn
the East to Utah, was unlawful in that plaintiff did not
have, and probably could not have, secured a permit from
the Interstate Commerce Commission to engage in that
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business. We shall discuss this last mentioned n1atter
under the next heading.
In Instruction No. 11 the jury was instructed:

"* * * that to warrant a recovery for loss of
profit which plaintiff claims it lost by reason of
the acts complained of, the evidence must establish
the amount of loss with reasonable certainty, and
no recovery can be had for loss of profits which
are uncertain contingent, conjectural or speculative, that is to say: that if by any chance or under
any condition of affairs existing at the time and
times complained of, no profits would have accrued even though the act complained of had not
occurred, there can be no allowance for profits
lost, and your verdict must be for defendants."
The foregoing instruction is in harmony with the authorities generally. See: 15 Am. Jur. 558, Sec. 150, and
numerous cases cited under notes 8 and 9 to the text.
To the same effect is the statement of the law in 25 C.J.S.
page 516, Sec. 42, where additional cases are cited in footnotes to the text. We have been unable to find a Utah
case where the question has been decided on facts comparable with the facts disclosed by the evidence in this
case. The case of United States Y. Griffith, et al.~ 310
Fed. ( 2d) 11. arose in Utah and was decided by the lOth
Circuit Court of Appeals. It lends color to the contention
of defendants. In nun1erous cases our Supreme Court
has held that generally the instructions given to the
jury, if not objected to, become the law of the case, and
as such are not open to attack. An1ong such cases are:
Morgan v. Ch!}d, Cole and Co., 61 Utah -!48. 213 Pac.177;
Schubach v. American Suref!l Co. of ~Tew York, 73 Utah
332, 27:~ Pae. D7 4; Straka v. r oyles, 69 lTtah 123, 252 Pac.

m1.

go
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It would be a Herculean task to review the cases cited
in the texts above referred to, and, therefore, we conceive
it to be more profitable to point out to the Court the failure of the evidence to support the judgment appealed
from rather than to review the numerous cases dealing
with the question now being considered.
Plaintiff offered in evidence loose leaf books which
it claims contained a record of its business during the
time it was engaged in transporting Swiss cheese fron1
Cache Valley, Utah, to New York, and other articles fron1
the East to Utah. At the time the books were so offered,
Counsel for defendants stated that no objection would be
made to the admission at the time of the offer, but probably objection would be made after an opportunity was
had to examine the books and further cross examination
was had of the bookkeeper. (Tr. 68) There the matter
was left and nothing further was said or done about the
admission of the books so offered in evidence.
It is defendants' contention that the books were not
shown to be competent evidence, and that even if the same
were admitted in evidence, the contents thereof would at
best be hearsay and insufficient to support the verdict
of the jury or the judgment based thereon.
This action is against strangers to the transactions
claimed to be reflected in the loose leaf books which were
offered in evidence. The law under such circumstances
is thus stated in Jones Commentaries on Evidence, Vol.
4, Chapter 18, pages 3284, et seq., where it is said that
the general rule is well established that books of account
'
including shop books, may not be used as evidence upon
issues between third persons; that entries in such books
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as to third persons are res inter alios acta and inadmissible against persons not parties to them unless a foundation is laid for their admission on special grounds. It is
further said by the same author, page 3312, that entries
must be made specific and particular, and that when
charges are made in gross, such entries must be rejected.
Such books, however, are admissible as an admission of
the party keeping the books. The same doctrine is stated
to be the law in 22 C..J. 877 and 32 C..J.S. 573, where cases
are collected in support of the text. Such is stated to be
the law by this Court in the case of Eureka Hill Jfining
Co. v. Bullion Beck & Champion Mining Co., 32 rtah 236,
90 Pac. 157. On the bottom of page 245 of the r tah Report it is said:
"They were kept (the books involved) by a
private corporation solely for its own purpose and
in the administration of its internal affairs, and I
do not think under any rule of evidence they may
be cmnpetent as ''itnesses to isolated and collateral facts in a suit between the corporation and a
stranger."
There are other reasons why the books of plaintiff
are without probative value in tlris case. Among which
are : A reading of the testilnony of Arne Hansen, the
bookkeeper of plaintiff, wlrich will be found on pages 209
to 229 of the Transcript, and wlrich has heretofore been
sum1narized, will show that the witness had no first hand
information of the facts purported to be recorded in the
books, and that it would take a week to get the information as to the source of profits for one year: that he could
not tPil what wa~ 1nade in hauling freight and what was
n1ade in the pnrcha~e and sale of property, etc. An exami·
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nation of the books will show that the lack of information
of witness Hansen is well founded. That the books are
conspicuous for what information they fail to contain
rather than what they do contain.
The audit made by Bunker, Tanner and Garrett for
the year 1953-± up to September 30, 1955, was received
in evidence as Exhibit P -3. As to the information reflected in that Exhibit it is obvious that if the source from
which such information was acquired is without probative
value, the audit would likewise be valueless. ~Ioreover,
that Exhibit is fatally defective as to whether or not the
business of plaintiff would prove to be profitable in the
future. Among its infirmaties are: The audit sho·ws an
expense for a strike notwithstanding the evidence shows
that there was no strike against plaintiff. It is made to
appear that the office salaries for the year ending Sep~
tember 30, 1953, was only $300.00, in the year September
30, 1954, only $375.00, while in the year ending September
30, 1955, such expenses were $1200.00. The General Administration expenses for the year ending on September
30, 1953, is placed at nothing, the year ending September
30, 1954, is placed at $55.87, and for the ~'Par ending
September 30, 1955, such expense is placed at $781.19.
It is, we submit, a matter of common knowledge that a
manager of a business that makes sales of property of thP
value of $862,574.60 during one year, $1,407,350 for thP
next year, and $65,829.28 for only a part of the next ~·ear,
cannot be conducted for two of the years for nothing, and
for $55.87 and $781.19, respectively, for the next year and
fraction of a year respectively. We wish to further oh93
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serve that under the case heretofore cited from Jones on
Evidence the gross statement of profits in the books and
the audit thereof must be rejected, because even if receivable by those who are parties to a transaction, they
are hearsay, and in the nature of a conclusion unless the
particularity of the transaction are revealed by the entry.
Before leaving this phase of the case, we wish to
1nake the further observation that even if the books of
plaintiff and the audit thereof were received in evidence
if, as the authorities hold, ~uch evidence is hearsay, no'
1natter how much of such evidence is admitted, the same
without some competent evidence "ill not support a
judgment. Moreover, the evidence shows that the Dorman
Company continued to receive cheese delivered to it by
plaintiff after the picketing cmnplained of, and that it
"·as willing to continue to do so without regard to whether
the same was delivered by plaintiff or othermse. (Tr.
:273, 298 and 301)
POINT IX.
THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED IN REFUSING
TO TAKE THE CASE FROM THE JURY AND RENDER A
JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANTS BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT PLAINTIFF WAS
AT THE Til\IE AND TIMES COMPLAINED OF UNLAWFULLY ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, AND MAY
NOT RECOVER DAMAGES ON ACCOUNT OF THE ACTS
COMPLAINED OF.
POINT X.
•
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT
DEFENDANTS TO FILE THEIR MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT
OF DEAN T. CORBETT IN SUPPORT THEREOF TORELIEVE DEFENDANTS, AND EACH OF THEM, OF THE
JUDGMENT AGAINST THEM, AND REFUSING TO GRANT
SUC~ MOTION.
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Under Points nine and ten defendants will discuss
their claim that the evidence shows without conflict that
plaintiff, during the time and times complained of, was
unlawfully engaged in interstate commerce; that the
affidavit of Dean F. Corbett lends additional support
to such claim; that the Court erred in refusing to permit
the filing of such Affidavit, and in refm:;ing to relieve
defendants from the judgment appealed from.
We quote the following from the laws of the United
States dealing with the transportation of property:
/

U.S.C.A., Title 49, Sec. 303, contains, among other t
\
provisions, the following:

\

"Sec. 6. The term permit means a permit is- \
sued under this chapter to contract carriers by
motor vehicle.
"Sec. 10. The term interstate commerce
means commerce between any place in a state and
any place in another state or between places in
the same state through another state whether such
commerce moves wholly by motor vehicle or partly
by motor vehicle and partly by rail express or
water.
"Sec. 15. The term contract carrier by motor
vehicle means any person which under individual
contracts or agreements engages in the transportation other than transportation referred to in
paragraph (14) of this section and the exception
therein (common carriers) by motor. vehicle of
passengers or property in interstate or foreign
·
commerce for compensation.
"(17) The term private carrier of property
by motor vehicle means any person not included
in the term common carrier by motor vehicle or
contract carrier by motor vehicle who or which
95
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transports, in interstate or foreign commerce,
motor vehicle property of which such person is
the owner, lessee or bailee when such transportation is for the purpose of sale, lease, rent or bailInent, or is in furtherance of anY commercial enterprise."
~

Title

Subsection (b) provides that the provisions of
49 do not apply to motor vehicles controlled and operated by any fanner ,,·hen used in the transportation of
his agricultural c01nmodities and products thereof, or in
the transportation of supplies to his farm, or (5) motor
vehicles controlled and operated by cooperative associations as defined in Sections 11±1-1141a, ll±le and ll±lj
of Title 1~, or by a federation of such-cooperative associations, if such federations possess no greater powers or
purposes than cooperative associations defined, or (6)
n1otor vehicles used in carrying property consisting of
ordinary livestock, fish (including shell fish), or agricultural cmnmodities (not including manufactured products thereof), if such n1otor vehicles are not used in carrying any other property or passengers for compensation.

Section 304, Subdirisio11 (:2) of Title 49 provides, ·
a1nong other 1natters. that it shall be the duty of the
Interstate Con11nerce Conuuission:
.. To regulate contract carriers by motor vehi(·le a~ pro,~ided in this chapter. and to that end
tlH' eonnui~~ion 1naY establish reasonable requirenHmt~ 'dth n"'~pPd 'to uniform systen1 of accounts,
r<'enrrl~. and report~. pre~erYation of records,
qualifications and maxin1un1 hours of service of
Pmplo~·ee~ and safet~- of operation and equipnlent."
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Section 309 of Title 49 provides that no person shall
engage in the business of a contract carrier by motor
vehicle in interstate or foreign commerce on any public
highway within any reservation under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States unless there is in force with
respect to such carrier a permit issued by the commission
authorizing such person to engage in such business. There
are some exceptions to the above provision, but the evidence in this case shows that plaintiff does not fall within
the exception.

The foregoing section contains provisions as to the
proceedings required to secure a permit and as to the
need of the service and the ability of the applicant to perform the same.
Section 311 of Title 49 provides that a broker who
arranges for transportation by a contract motor carrier
shall have a license issued by the Interstate Commerce
Commission.
Bection 312 of Title 49 provides for the transfer,
change and revocation of a permit.
Section 315 of Title 49 provides for the furnishing of
security for the protection 6f the public.
Section 318 provides for the establishment and observance of reasonable minimum rates and charges of
a contract carrier and to file the same with the Commission.
Section 322 provides for the punishment for anyone
who violates the provisions of the act.

97
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Since the enactment of the Federal Transportation
Act there have been a number of cases wherein the courts
have been called upon to construe the act. We shall discuss two of such cases which have been decided hy the
Federal Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in one of which
certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court of the rnited
States. In light of the fact that Utah is within the Tenth
1
(_ ircuit Court and federal law is involved, this Court
~hould be bound by said decisions.
The facts in the case of Stickle Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comntission, (lOth Cir.) 128 Fed. (2d) 155; certiorari denied, 317 U.S. 650; 63 S. Ct. 46, 87 L. Ed. 523,
were these:
The Stickle Company was a corporation ·which owned
and operated ten motor vehicles which were used to transport lumber from :Mills located in Oklahoma, Texas,
Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, and Illinois. The company
hired the drivers and owned the trucks, together with
storage yards in Oklahoma City. It advertised that it had
lumber for sale. When orders for lmuber were given, it
proceeded to purchase the lu1nber ordered and deliver the
same to the purchaser. It was held that the transportation of lumber by the emupany was not an incident to a
comn1ercial enterprise. and that on the contrary the buying and selling lu1nber is a 1neans and deviee employed
hy the company to enable it to engage in the transportation of lumber as a eontrart carrier without eomplying
with the provisions of the law with respect to eontract
<'arners. It was so held as a matter of law. In the eourse
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of the opinion the Court quoted with approval from the
case of George Truck Systems, Inc. v. Interstate Com1nerce Commission, (5th Cir.) 123 Fed. (2d) 210, at 212,
where it is said:
"We need not indulge here in any of these
refinements. It is sufficient for us to say that the
invoked statute is a highly remedial one, that the
terms are broadly comprehensive enough to bring
them all, all of those who, no matter what forms
they use, are in substance engaged in the business
of interstate or foreign transportation of property
on the highways for hire."
It may be noted that in the Stickle case above cited
Judge Huxley dissented upon the ground that the law
permitted an owner of property to transport the same
without complying with the law, if it did so in good faith,
and that as the law permitted an owner of property to
transport the same without securing a permit from the
Interstate Commerce Commission, it was the function
of Congress and not the courts to amend the law so as
to make the same apply to cases like the Stickle case.

In the case of Scott v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 213 Fed. 30, these were the material facts:
Scott was the successful bidder to sell and deliver
to the Hollaman Airbase in New Mexico between December 1, 1951, and May, 1952, 625,000 gallons of fuel oil, and
he performed the contract on his part by purchasing the
product from a refinery in New Mexico and transp~rted
the same by tank trucks to the airbase, and there delivered it. Scott entered into a written contract with the Shell
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Oil Company, a distributor of gasoline and other petroleum products, in which he agreed to sell to such company
at delivered prices large quantities of first structure
gasoline. Similar contracts "Were entered into with other
purchasers of gasoline. His delivered charge was the
cost of the product at the refinery plus an additional
charge which was comparable to but less than the cost of
transportation of common carriers. He bore the loss from
the failure of the product to meet quality requirements,
loss from storage, loss from spoilage and loss from the
failure of the customer to accept delivery. He did not
perform any service from which he could gain a profit
except the service of transportation. It was held by the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in the foregoing Scott
case that the legal ownership of the product at the time
of its transportation is not necessarily controlling in detennining whether the one transporting the property is a
contract carrier or a private carrier. That Scott's primary business being that of transporting gasoline and
other petroleum products under individual contracts or
agreetnents for compensation he falls within the elass of
contract carriers even though title to such products is
vested in him at the time of their transportation.
If we con1pare the facts in the foregoing cases with
th~ facts in the present case, it will readily be seen that
the facts in this case are much stronger in establishing
that plaintiff was at all tunes here involved a contract
carrier. Thus it appears from the testimony of Mr.
0 o~~nPr that plaii1tiff was created for the express purpo~(' of transporting the Swiss eht•ese Inanufactured by
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the Dairy Association to market; the contract of employment of Mr. Gossner provides that the title to the property at all times should remain \Vith the Dairy Association. The payment for the cheese was made to the Dairy
Association in most cases the same day that the Dorman
Company paid plaintiff. When Dorman wrote the letter,
plaintiff's Exhibit P-4, it was addressed to Cache \T alle~T
Dairy, and not to plaintiff. Plaintiff was without funds
to pay for the cheese unless and until Dorman paid for
the cheese. So far as appears plaintiff assumed none of
the risk of the loss, or spoilage of the cheese in transportation or the refusal of Dorman to accept or pay for the
cheese. It is submitted that the facts in this case conclusively show that plaintiff at the time and times here
involved was a contract carrier, and as such its operations
were unlawful in transporting the cheese to X e\Y York
without first complying with the Federal Transportation
Act dealing with contract carriers.
There is another provision of the Federal Transportation Act affecting contract carriers which deserves brief
mention. We refer to sub-paragraph b (4a) of Section
303 of Title 49, U.S.C.A., wherein it is provided that the
Act shall not apply to motor vehicles used in carrying
property consisting of ordinary livestock, fish (including
shell fish) or agricultural commodities (not including
manufactured products thereof), if such motor vPh i<·l<>s
are not used in carrying any other property or J>assen!.(Prs
for compensation. Plaintiff does not bring itself within
the exception because Swiss cheese is a manufacturP<l
product. Frozen Food Express v. United Stales, c! ul ..
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1:28 Fed. Supp. 37 4, 351 U.S. 40. For a review of the cases
dealing with that matter - 12 Federal Cases, Section
81,100.
rrhe trucks of plaintiff, according to the testimony
of its \Vitness Hansen, were at times used to haul freight
fron1 the east for compensation. The evidence with respect to the claim that plaintiff acquired title to property
in the East and resold the same here in Utah contains
!·he same information as does the claim of title to the
cheese. ~Ioreover, even if the plaintiff for a time was successful in hauling freight fron1 the East to "Ctah for compensation without a permit, it would be pure speculation
to conclude that it could continue to do so without a permit or to conclude that plaintiff could secure a permit.
So also does the testimony of ~Ir. Gossner show· that a
profit could not be n1ade by plaintiff without a backhaul
fron1 the East.
Fr01n what has been said it is apparent that plaintijf is here seeking to recover damages because of a claim
that it ha~ been put out of conducting an unla-wful busine:-;~. a business that it never had a right to pursue. \Ye
haY(' been unable to find a rase where damages have been
aJlowed because one has been deprived of anticipated
profits to lw derived fr01n conducting an unlawful busine:-;~. \\'" f' doubt that any such case can be found. The
court:-; generally hold that one may not recover damages
growing out of the breach of a-n unlawful contract. 1~
A Ill. Jur. Sc('. 153~ papc ().fi. BakerY. La.tses. 60 rtah38,
21Hi Pa1·. ;););~: Short Y. Bullion Beck J!in. Co .. ~0 Ftah ~0.
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57 Pac. 720. For much stronger reasons one may not
recover damages on account of anticipated profits to be
derived from the continuation of an unlawful business.
It may be noted that the fact that the perpetrator
• of an unlawful act does not know the act to be unlawful,
but believes it to be lawful, does not excuse the performance of the act. 12 Am. Jur. Sec. 153, page 647, and

cases cited in footnote.
Attention is again called to the testimony of .Jir.
Gossner that plaintiff did not have a permit from the
Interstate Commerce Commission to engage in the transportation of property in interstate commerce, and that
Mr. Gossner, while he was probably a broker, there is
no evidence that he had a license to serve as such as
provided in Section 311, Title 49, U.S.C.A. above qttoted.
(Tr. 84) So also is there no dispute that some of plaintiff's profits came from hauling freight. (Tr. 31) The
affidavit of .Jfr. Corbett shows that the transaction
whereby :Mr. Gossner testified that he bought the cheese
from the Cache Valley Association, and sold the same
to the Dormans and is not bonafide, or, if so, such transactions do not relieve plaintiff from necessity of SP('U ring a permit from the Interstate Commerce Commission
as required by the law above cited as (·onstrued by the
cases above mentioned. That being so the court below
erred in refusing to permit the motion and affidavit to
relieve defendants from the judgment appealed from.
Doubtless, defendants had a right to file the motion and
affidavit, and, therefore, the Court erred in refm;iug
permission to file the same. However, if, cont nu·~· to
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defendants' contention, the motion and affidavit could
not aid defendants, then and under such circumstances
defendants were not prejudiced. But the facts recited in
th(• affidavit precludes plaintiff from the recovery of any
judgment in its favor, and entitles defendants to be •
relieved from the judgment appealed from as provided
l>~· n?tle 60 (b) (3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
By our discussion of the rights of defendants to be relieved from the judgment rendered against them, ·we do
not wish to be understood as conceding that the verdict
and judgment are without support in the evidence independent of the averments contained in the affidavit of
:JI r. Corbett.
POINT ELEVEN
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING AN OBJECTION TO THE TESTIMONY OFFERED BY THEIR WITNESS, CLARENCE LOTT, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE
WAGES PAID AT THE CACHE YALLEY PLANT WERE
LESS THAN THAT PAID IN ADJOINIXG TERRITORY. (Tr.
331)

The attention of the Court is called to the testimony
of ~[r. Thoresen, a witness called by plaintiff wherein he
tc>:-:tifierl that he was infonned by :Jir. Rash that the
wap;P:-: in Star Valley were twenty per cent less than at
Ca<'lw \~alley Co-op. ( Tr. 179) The testinwny offered
h~· ~r r. Lott was to refute any claiin that the wages at
:--;tar Valley was twenty per cent less than that at the
Ca<'IH· \'allP)' Co-op. r~eo pennit such testin1ony as that of
Mr. Thore~wn to go undisputed could not help but prejudi<·<' tlw jury against defendants.
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POINT TWELVE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING, OVER
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION, THE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF EXHIBIT P-4. (Tr. 338)

Exhibit P-4 puports to be a letter sent by Dorman
to the Cache Valley Dairy. It is dated August 22, 1955,
and is as follows:
"Dear Ed:
This is to let you know that the trailer fron1
:Mid-States arrived this morning and we were not
permitted to unload as our Union Delegate forbid
this merchandise. We need this cheese and anything you can do to get this clear for unloading
will be appreciated.
(N.Y.)
Vic
Victor Dorman"
N. Dorman & Co., Inc.
Very truly yours,
It will be seen that the letter is not addressed to
plaintiff. There is no evidence that the writing of this
letter had anything to do with the picketing complained
of. No opportunity was given the defendants to cross
examine Victor Dorman as to what caused him to writP
the letter. That being so, it was extremely prejudicial
to permit the jury to speculate as to what was the occasion for writing the letter, or whether or not t hP defendants had anything to do with the matter which brought
about the writing of the letter.
lOS'
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POINT THIRTEEN
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT P-16 TO BE ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE.
(Tr. 339)

That Exhibit purports to be an audit of some of the
books of plaintiff. The record fails to show whether the
books claimed to have been audited were or were notreceived in evidence. That being so, it would seem selfevident that the Exhibit was incompetent.
POINT FOURTEEN
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
A NEW TRIAL.

If defendants are entitled to prevail on their attacks
on the judgment upon the grounds urged, that, of course,
would put an end to this litigation. If, however, the Court
should, contrary to our contention conclude otherwise,
then defendants urge that a new trial be granted. In
addition to the errors heretofore discussed, there is a
failure of any endeavor to support a verdict for the
amount awarded. At the legal rate of interest the judgment, if paid, would produce an income of $6000.00 a
year. That would mean that in less than seventeen years
plaintiff would realize the amount of the judgment in
interest and still have the principal left, and that without engaging in any business other than lending the
money. It 1nay be asked where is there any evidence in
this reeord which ~how~ or tends to show how long a business such as that of plaintiff would continue to exist. To
infonu the jury as wa~ done in Instruction ~ o. 9 was to
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invite the jury to make a guess as to the damages that
plaintiff might sustain on account of the picketing of
one of its trucks and is, we submit, to require the jury to
engage in unadulterated speculation.
In our search we have been unable to find a case
where an instruction such as No.9 has been approved by
a court of last resort. We have found c.ases where the
measure of damages for destroying a business has been
fixed at its market value at the time it was destroyed,
but we doubt that any case from a court of last resort can
be found where a jury has been permitted to speculate on
how long a business will continue to exist without some
evidence upon which to base such a determination.

It is respectfully sub1nitted that the judgment appealed from be reversed, that the court below be directed
to enter a judgment in favor of the defendants, and each
of them, and that appellants be awarded their costs on
their appeal and in the tri.al court.
Respectfully submitted,

CLARENCE M. BECK
A. PARK SMOOT
and

ELIAS HANSEN
Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants
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